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# PERSIAN IONIA UNDER DARIUS: THE REVOLT RECONSIDERED<sup>1</sup>

For Raphael Sealey

The ostensible subject of this paper is Herodotus' account of the Ionian Revolt. Its real subject – as any historian's work using Herodotus must be – is the question of Herodotus' veracity and reliability. The state of this question concerning the revolt itself is found in Oswyn Murray's recent reassessment of Herodotus' narrative in the light of its basis in Ionian oral traditions. He argues that Herodotus' East Greek history is slanted toward folktale patterns, and is thus less reliable than the secular traditions, based on family history, of mainland Greece. Worse, the traditions concerning the revolt itself are "those of a defeated people ... fragmented into individual episodes of folly, treachery or heroism."<sup>2</sup> The memories to which Herodotus was a witness were those of a

- 1 The following abbreviations occur in the notes:

Balcer, *Sparda* = J. Balcer, *Sparda by the Bitter Sea: Imperial Interaction in Western Anatolia* (1984)

Berve, *Tyrannis* = H. Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* (1967)

CAH<sup>2</sup> = *Cambridge Ancient History*, 2nd edition

CHI = *Cambridge History of Iran*

Figueira, *Aegina* = T.J. Figueira, *Aegina: Society and Politics* (1981)

Georges, *Barbarian Asia* = P. Georges, *Barbarian Asia and the Greek Experience from the Archaic Period to the Age of Xenophon* (1994)

How and Wells, *Commentary* = W.W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* (1912)

Kraay, *Coins* = C.M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins* (1976)

Murray, "Oral History" = "Herodotus and Oral History," in *Achaemenid History II: The Greek Sources: Proceedings of the 1984 Achaemenid History Workshop*, ed. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1987) 92–115

Murray, "Revolt" = O. Murray, "The Ionian Revolt," CAH<sup>2</sup> IV (1988) 461–490

Tozzi, *Rivolta ionica* = P. Tozzi, *La rivolta ionica* (1978)

This paper is a much transformed version of one which I read nearly ten years ago before a meeting of classicists in the Boston area. In seeing it finally into the light of day I owe much to many. It was first improved by the remarks of Ernst Badian and Steven Hirsch from the audience, and by the long, hand-written comments I soon received from Alan Boegehold. In recasting it since, I have been greatly helped by the perspicacious criticisms of the anonymous readers, to whom I am truly grateful for their selfless efforts on this paper's behalf. I am also in the debt of the American editors of *Historia*, Kurt Raaflaub and his successor Mortimer Chambers, for their advice and corrections, and not least for their warm encouragement. Truly, τὸ ὠφέλιμον φίλον ἐστίν.

- 2 Murray, "Revolt" at 470; cf. his "Oral History," esp. 103–108; also U. Walter, "Herodot und die Ursachen des Ionischen Aufstandes," *Historia* 42 (1993) 257–278.

deeply shamed people, in which apologetic predominates. In sum, Herodotus does not, in Murray's view, furnish trustworthy materials for a history of the revolt.

Murray's second main argument lies outside Herodotus. Behind Herodotus' explanation that the cause of the Ionians' insurrection lay in their desire to be rid of their tyrants, Murray sees an economic origin for the revolt, alleging the "disastrous" effects of Persia's western expansion on the commerce and opportunities of the Ionian cities.<sup>3</sup>

This paper challenges Murray on these two main issues. First, whereas he maintains that the Ionians revolted because the Persians were making them poorer, I try to show that the Ionians must have been prospering under Persia at the time of the revolt. Second, I try to show that Herodotus' account is consistent with what we know about Persian Ionia, with the politics of the Persian empire under Darius, and with the motives of the leading actors, even in its apparently tendentious, folkloric or confused elements, such as the alleged betrayal of the Naxian expedition by the Persian commander Megabates (5.33), the tale of the Tattooed Slave (5.35), and Histiaeus' intrigues at Sardis against Artaphrenes (6.4). The aim of this paper, then, is currently unfashionable: to show that Herodotus' account furnishes the materials for a coherent and credible account of the actors and events it presents, rather than to treat it as if it were the product of oral traditions comparable in their malleability to the tribal lore of primitives.<sup>4</sup>

### I. The Wealth of Persian Ionia

Murray rests his picture of "the increasing erosion of the economic prosperity of Ionia," of which "the revolt was both a consequence and a consummation,"<sup>5</sup> on three grounds. First, he treats the absence of Greek pottery at Naucratis c. 525–500 as evidence that Greek trade in Egypt lapsed after Cambyses' conquest. Next, he argues that the Persians' penetrations into Scythia and Thrace shrank Greek opportunities in these directions as well. Finally, he points out that the

3 Murray, "Revolt" (as in n. 1) 475f. This view also belongs to another recent student of the revolt, H.T. Wallinga, "The Ionian Revolt," *Mnemosyne* 37 (1984) 401–437, and has found its way into the latest *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd ed. (1996) 764: article "Ionian Revolt," by D.G. Lateiner.

4 Contra Murray, "Oral History" (as in n. 1) 92–100. My aim parallels that of J. Ober, writing on "The Athenian Revolution of 508/7 B.C." in C. Daugherty and L. Kurke, eds., *Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics* (1993) 215–32, at 215: "to show that by sticking very closely to the primary sources, it is possible to derive a plausible and internally coherent narrative" of an episode of Greek history for which we must depend primarily on Herodotus' testimony.

5 Murray, "Revolt" (as in n. 1) 478.

fall of Croesus and the Saïte pharaohs deprived the Ionians of royal markets for both their luxury goods and their mercenaries.

Is this a true picture? Murray himself concludes that the “size of the navies at the battle of Lade is the most significant indication of the prosperity and naval power of Ionia in this period: Chios had provided 100 triremes, Miletus 80, Samos 60; in contrast the two great naval powers of mainland Greece in the archaic age, Corinth and Aegina, could provide only 40 and 30 triremes respectively at the battle of Salamis.”<sup>6</sup> A contrast, indeed, especially as the growth of Corinthian and Aeginetan commerce has been explained (with anachronistic inference from contemporary conditions of international trade) as a consequence of the supposed decline of Ionia under Persian rule.<sup>7</sup>

Murray’s account would seem to have it both ways. To save the phenomena according to Murray’s view a reader must assume that the Ionians still had immense wealth stored up for a rainy day – a practice unattested before Athens’ imperial reserve in the later fifth century. Or, better, one can look for factual evidence of a continuing, and very high, level of material prosperity that enabled the Ionians to finance the greatest naval war the Mediterranean world had yet seen.

Such evidence exists. Late archaic Greece was nourished by a well-documented increase of trade and manufactures within the immense triangle formed by the Pontus, Egypt, and Magna Graecia.<sup>8</sup> This new prosperity is reflected in the well-known increase of public monuments in stone and private dedications of munificent aristocrats and magnificent tyrants.<sup>9</sup> It is this general increase in the scope and velocity of commerce, and not the supposed opportunities left open by a declining Ionia, which accounts for the increased commerce of Corinth and

6 Ibid. 490.

7 Aegina: Figueira, *Aegina* (as in n. 1) 147, 271. Corinth: J. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 B.C.* (1984) 117–120, 171f., 175.

8 The expansion of Greek material culture and Greek commerce between 800 and 500 B.C. is a theme spanning many of the chapters of the new *CAH*<sup>2</sup> III.3 (1982) and IV (1988): see especially T.F.R.G. Braun, “The Greeks in the Near East,” *CAH*<sup>2</sup> III.3.1–31 and “The Greeks in Egypt,” *ibid.*, 32–56, C.G. Starr, “Economic and Social Conditions in the Greek World,” *ibid.* 417–461; J. Boardman, “Material Culture [c. 525–479],” *CAH*<sup>2</sup> IV.414–430. On the growth of the northern Pontus in general, which had close relations with East Greece and is usually scanted by the surveys, see A.X. Kocybala, *Greek Colonization on the North Shore of the Black Sea in the Archaic Period* (Diss. U. Pennsylvania: 1978). On the Milesian foundation of Olbia in particular see A. Wasowicz, *Olbia pontique et son territoire: l’aménagement de l’espace* (*AnnLittBesançon* 168: 1975) esp. 69–78.

9 P.H. Young, *Building Projects of the Archaic Greek Tyrants* (Diss. U. Pennsylvania: 1980), with bibliography. On the growth of Delphi, sponsored by Cypselid magnificence, see Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth* (as in n. 7) 84–89. The archaic Artemisium at Ephesus: D.G. Hogarth, *The Archaic Artemisia* (1908); the Archaic Didymaeum of Miletus: G. Gruben, “Das archaische Didymaion,” *Jdl* 78 (1963) 78–182.

Aegina, and of other non-Ionian Greek states as well: the rising tide lifted everyone's boats.

This age also saw a great increase and wide circulation of silver coins throughout the East Mediterranean from the last quarter of the sixth century onward. Some of this coinage may represent the transfer of existing wealth – bullion, metallic booty, etc., into a new form.<sup>10</sup> But this increase is also contemporary with the first period of high exploitation of the mines of Thrace. Though Thrace was by no means the only source of Greek silver, it is arguable – especially from the coinage of Aegina – that by the late sixth century this region may have provided roughly as much silver to the Greek world as the other sources put together.<sup>11</sup>

It is only from this time, moreover, that hoards of silver coins – a mixture of Thraco-Macedonian, Greek, and Persian issues – are increasingly to be found in Egypt, despite the contemporary hiatus at Naucratis.<sup>12</sup> Under the Saïtes Naucratis had been the depot for grain export. But by this time the grain trade had shifted to the Black Sea, where the northern Pontus (Ukraine) had become the major grain source for the Greeks.<sup>13</sup> This fact helps account naturally for the hiatus at Naucratis.<sup>14</sup> An anecdote of Herodotus (3.139.1) suggests that Greek trade in Egypt was attracted to Memphis after Cambyses' conquest broke Naucratis' monopoly of commerce established by the Saïtes (2.179).<sup>15</sup> Here, where the

10 See especially Figueira, *Aegina* (as in n. 1) 107–125 on the the relationship of hoarded bullion (including cult treasure), public expenditure, and coinage in late archaic Aegina.

11 J.H. Kroll and N.M. Waggoner, "Dating the Earliest Coins of Athens, Corinth and Aegina," *AJA* 88 (1984) 333–338, esp. chart on p. 337. Tests of Aeginetan coins of this period indicate that Laurion, Siphnos, and Thrace (from the Orrescioi and Thasos), in that order, were the principal sources of origin: Figueira, *ibid.* 144–149. See also N.H. Gale et al. in D.M. Metcalf and W.A. Eddy, edd., *Metallurgy in Numismatics* (1980) 33–43: Laureion and Siphnos together account for 41% of silver analyzed from 46 archaic tortoisés; the authors suggest that the third source of Aeginetan silver should be located "in Macedonia, Lydia, or even Euboea." Of these Lydia under Persia appears to have monopolized its own metals, for sigloi are quite rare in the hoards outside Asia Minor: Kraay, *Coins* (as in n. 1) 35. The Euboean mines had no reputation for productivity. Much of the balance of Aeginetan silver can only have come from the Thraco-Macedonian area.

12 M.M. Austin, *Greece and Egypt in the Archaic Age* (PCPhS Suppl. 2, 1970) 37–40 with bibliography on 72f.; Braun, "The Greeks in Egypt," *CAH*<sup>2</sup> III.3.32–56, who notes that merchants could profit from importing silver into Egypt, where its purchasing power bore a high premium because the Egyptians had no supplies of their own. Braun postulates a three-cornered trade, in which Greeks traded woolens for silver in Thrace, and traded silver in Egypt for goods destined for East Greece.

13 C. Roebuck, *Ionian Trade and Colonization* (1959) 116–130 and *id.*, "Trade," *CAH*<sup>2</sup> IV.451, n. 8; T.S. Noonan, "The Grain Trade of the Northern Black Sea in Antiquity," *AJP* 94 (1973) 231–242.

14 Austin (as in n. 12) 14–39; Braun (as in n. 8) *CAH*<sup>2</sup> III.3.32–48.

15 Unattributed citations are to Herodotus throughout.

Persians had their headquarters, was a colony of Greeks (the so-called *Hellenomemphitai*), and the record of Corinthian and East Greek pottery at Memphis is continuous through the hiatus at Naucratis.<sup>16</sup> The evidence of the pottery and the coins together vitiates Murray's contention that Greeks could not do business in Egypt after the Persian conquest.

Moreover, Cambyses' march to Egypt seems to have stimulated Greek activity in the Levant. Notable is the revival of the hitherto moribund Greek emporium at Al Mina at the mouth of the Orontes. The town was laid out in new blocks in the epoch of Cambyses' conquest of Egypt (c. 525), when the sixty-year hiatus in the Greek pottery sequence there ended.<sup>17</sup> Evidently Cambyses' preparations in Syria for this campaign (3.5ff.) attracted Greek sutlers, traders, and mercenaries once again to Al Mina, which remained a port of call for Greek vessels thereafter, as did Posideion (=present Cape Basit) some 24 km down the coast (3.91 init.).<sup>18</sup>

Egypt and the Levant, where the Phoenicians were not yet minting currencies of their own, were consumers of Greek silver in exchange for their products. Given this drain, to which the Persian tribute must be added, Thrace must have become very important to the East Greeks for its silver, apart from its other natural wealth. Thus, when Darius appropriated western Scythia and the Thracian hinterland the Ionians must have hoped to benefit. For the Persians in Europe reached into the sources of precious metals not only in lower Thrace and Pangaeus, but in Transylvania as well, where the Romans long afterward would exploit the mines of Dacia.<sup>19</sup>

Some Greeks already had mining interests in Thrace. Thasos and Abdera, two *poleis* close to the Thracian mining area, coined copiously beginning from

16 Braun (as in n. 8) 46 with notes 46 and 47.

17 Roebuck, *Ionian Trade* (as in n. 13) 64; E. Gjerstad, "The Stratification at Al Mina (Syria) and its Chronological Evidence," *Acta Archaeologica* 45 (1975) 107–123; Braun (as in n. 8), 10f. with n. 32; A.J. Graham, "The Historical Interpretation of Al Mina," *DHA* 12 (1986) 51–65; M.M. Austin, *Relations between Greece and the Levant in the Archaic Age* (Diss. Cambridge University: 1968).

18 Braun (as in n. 8), places Posideion, in agreement with Strabo XVI.2.8, at Cape Basit, where "recent French excavations have shown that it has a history of Greek imports nearly as long as that of Al Mina."

19 J.B. Bury, "The European Expedition of Darius," *CR* 11 (1897) 277–281, now epigraphically supported by a foundation inscription of Darius found near the site of a Roman frontier fort in Dacia convenient to the mines: J. Harmatta, "Un peuple finno-ougrien dans la tradition littéraire de l'antiquité," *AAHung* 2 (1954) 1–14. On the fort: D. Protase, "Exercitus Daciae Porolissensis et la défense des frontières septentrionales de la Dacie," *Actes du ix congrès international d'études sur les frontières romaines* (1974) 227–233. See also P. Georges, "Darius in Scythia: The Formation of Herodotus' Sources and the Nature of Darius' Campaign," *AJA* 11 (1987 [1995]) 97–147, esp. 129–130. For "a series of new finds of Old Persian objects in Bulgaria and Romania which speaks of a Persian army and administration in those areas" see Harmatta in *Hérodote et les peuples non grecs* (*Entretiens Fondation Hardt* 35, 1990) 129 with nn. 30 and 32.

this time.<sup>20</sup> The causes of this increased minting activity are likely to be complex; but recent archaeological research on the revival of large-scale trade in early medieval northern Europe, based on coinage imported on an increasingly massive scale from the Abbasid Caliphate, has shown that when coins came into use there even as bullion, the demand for them grew rapidly.<sup>21</sup> This was certainly true of the Greek world in the sixth century.<sup>22</sup>

The prevalence of Thraco-Macedonian coins in the hoards of the western satrapies, in which silver from every source in the Aegean world and Cyprus is represented, must reflect in part the effect of Darius' assessment of tribute in silver on his Greek subjects. Consequently, they needed to trade for silver where they could. The sharp increase of minting by Abdera and Thasos in the period following the arrival of the Persians in Thrace reflects Darius' organization of Ionia and Thrace together as a single economic unit for production of silver to support the costs of the Ionian arm of the Persian navy.<sup>23</sup>

Yet other cities that were not subject to Persia, especially Aegina, and to a lesser extent Corinth, also minted great quantities of silver at this time.<sup>24</sup> Not only some Aeginetan silver issues but also a large proportion of Thraco-Macedonian pieces directly from these mining areas become prominent in the hoards

- 20 Thasos: Kraay, *Coins* (as in n. 1) 149: "The principal and most enduring mint of the [West Thrace-Pangaeus] area was the island of Thasos .... It appears that the mint of Thasos did not open until the last quarter of the [sixth] century, and that it was not until near 500 that its output became at all plentiful." Abdera: J.M.F. May, *The Coinage of Abdera* (1966) 2–4.
- 21 R. Hodges, *Dark Age Economics: The Origins of Towns and Trade AD 600–1000* (1982); R. Hodges and D. Whitehouse, *Mohammed, Charlemagne, and the Origins of Europe* (1983).
- 22 Kraay, "Coinage," *CAH*<sup>2</sup> IV.440–445. But Kraay also argues that coins in this period were not minted primarily to facilitate long-distance commerce, but for public expenditures of a kind that generally kept the city's wealth in coins close to home, even those of such a major trading city as Aegina, where "the major hoards of Aeginetan coins are confined to the Aegean islands and Crete – an area, that is, comparatively close to Aegina and using the same weight standard." Only the widely distributed coins of Athens and of the Thraco-Macedonian region, areas which possessed their own silver mines and could therefore export their surpluses, are true exceptions (ibid. 443). But Kraay does not go so far as to deny that silver coins and bullion were a ubiquitous and increasingly important means of exchange and measure of wealth – as exemplified most definitely by Darius' well-known standard of tribute, the silver talent (3.89–93). On the original uses of civic coinage see also T.R. Martin, "Why did the Greek *Polis* Originally Need Coins?," *Historia* 45 (1996) 257–283.
- 23 Correctly seen by Wallinga, "Ionian Revolt" (as in n. 3), esp. 404–413; id. "The Ancient Persian Navy and Its Predecessors," in *Achaemenid History I: Sources, Structures, and Synthesis*, ed. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1987) 46–77, esp. 66ff.
- 24 Aegina: Figueira, *Aegina* (as in n. 1) 103, tabulates the relatively enormous output of the Aeginetan mint from 530 to 480, which was greatest in the period before 500. Corinth and her colonies: Kraay, *Coins* (as in n. 1) 78–82.

from the maritime provinces of the Persian empire well before the end of the sixth century. The Thracian coinages, both Greek and tribal, grow especially copious up to the period after 479, when the Macedonian kingdom and Athens gained control of the region and appropriated its wealth in metals.<sup>25</sup>

Many cities of East Greece began to coin silver for the first time only after the Persians took Thrace. New silver issues began to flow from older mints, including Chios, Samos, Ephesus, and Clazomenae.<sup>26</sup> Teos, many of whose citizens had emigrated following the Persian conquest, was beginning to prosper again, probably from access to Thracian silver from her daughter city, Abdera.<sup>27</sup> The Abderites themselves possessed the richest of these early civic coinages.<sup>28</sup> The conclusion is inescapable that the Persian possession of Thrace was responsible for this large increase in Greek coinage.<sup>29</sup>

From Cyrus' conquest onward the Persians themselves had consciously fostered the monetization of their economic relations with their Greeks, by maintaining the former Lydian mint at Sardis to produce Lydian-style issues for local use in Ionia, Caria, and Phrygia.<sup>30</sup> These satrapies constituted the Empire's unique "coinage area," in striking contrast to the likewise commercially oriented Phoenicians, who saw no need to mint their own coinages in this period.<sup>31</sup> The Persians' willingness to maintain the Lydian mint in order to facilitate their relations with the Ionians is all the more remarkable in light of the great reluctance of the Achaemenid central administration at Persepolis to give out silver in lieu of rations and other payments in kind.<sup>32</sup>

Students of the Achaemenid system emphasize the Persians' conscious intention to accommodate their rule to their subjects' ways of material life, religion, and culture.<sup>33</sup> In Ionia, Cyrus was evidently so concerned to deal with

25 Kraay, *Coins* (as in n. 1) 135–142.

26 Ibid. 34–39.

27 J. Balcer, "The Early Silver Coinage of Teos," *Schweiz. num. Rundschau* 47 (1967) 5f., who dates the earliest Teian coinage to the 540s, only a few years after some Teians had left in the wake of Cyrus' conquest to found Abdera and Phanagoria in Pontus; but the issues become copious only after the Persian conquest of Thrace.

28 May, *Abdera* (as in n. 20) 2–4.

29 So Kraay, *Coins* (as in n. 1) 131: "Persian occupation of this area ... coincided with an impressive increase in the archaic coinages."

30 Direct continuity between the Croesan coinage and the earliest Persian issues is proved by die links: D. Schlumberger, *L'argent grec dans l'empire achéménide* (1953) 12f., with Naster in *Congresso internazionale di numismatica: II. Atti* (1965) 25ff.

31 The Phoenicians did not begin coining until the mid-fifth century: Kraay, *Coins* (as in n. 1) 286ff.

32 R.T. Hallock, "The Evidence of the Persepolis Tablets," *CHI* II.603.

33 E.g., T. Cuyler Young in *CAH*<sup>2</sup> IV, describing a "policy of remarkable tolerance based on a respect for individual people, ethnic groups, other religions and ancient kingdoms," in contrast to the ruthlessness of the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian empires ("The Early History of the Medes and the Persians and the Achaemenid Empire to the Death of



the Greeks in the ways to which the Lydian Mermnads had accustomed them that he at first left a Lydian in authority over Croesus' treasury (1.153.3). This Lydian, whose name was Pactyes, used the gold of Sardis, says Herodotus (1.154), to hire mercenaries among the peoples of the coast, and he induced some of the Greeks to rebel.

Pactyes presumably used coin, and it has been posited with great plausibility that the Lydian kings had invented coinage for just this purpose of paying soldiers, among other royal disbursements in large amounts.<sup>34</sup> Everything we know about archaic Lydia points to an increasingly close cultural, political, and economic union between Lydians and Ionians.<sup>35</sup> It can hardly be doubted that well before the time of Croesus' fall Greeks, and warlike natives such as the Carians as well, had grown accustomed to reward in coin for services to the Lydian crown. To make expeditious use of the Ionians, then, the Persians too needed coin. Thus Cyrus and Cambyses kept up the production of coins of the kind familiar to Greeks, and Cambyses employed willing Greeks in his conquest of Egypt (3.1.1).<sup>36</sup>

Cambyses," 42). This was "good Realpolitik," but was owed very probably to the Persians' "own forms of idealized social structure" ("The Consolidation of the Empire and its Limits of Growth under Darius and Xerxes," 103f.). On the Persians' address to the Greeks, see Georges, *Barbarian Asia* (as in n. 1) 47–75.

34 R.M. Cook, "Speculations on the Origins of Coinage," *Historia* 7 (1958) 257ff.

35 Recent discussion and bibliography in Georges, *Barbarian Asia* (as in n. 1) 13–46.

36 Wallinga's view, in "Ionian Revolt" (as in n. 3) 407ff., that Cambyses' Egyptian expedition was carried out at the naval subjects' expense and bore hard on them, cannot be sustained. We note that Cambyses "scattered to his army with his own hand" the Cyreneans' offering of five hundred minas of silver (3.13.4: supposedly a gesture of contempt for a gift – eight and a third silver talents – that Cambyses thought niggardly: an element in Herodotus' portrait of Cambyses as a madman; see Georges, *Barbarian Asia* [as in n. 1] 186–195). Silver was the most appropriate medium for rewarding Greeks and Carians, and this act looks like a magnanimous conqueror's bonus to his best sailors, carried out personally. The value of these Greeks to Cambyses is illustrated by the story that the Egyptians were punished by the royal judges for butchering the crew of a Mytilenean trireme at the scale of ten noble Egyptian victims for each Mytilenean, so that two thousand youths including the son of the Pharaoh himself were led out to die (3.13.1–14.5). These anecdotes do not view service under Cambyses a burden imposed on slaves. The Samian tyrant Polycrates is also seen volunteering his navy to Cambyses; he must have been acting as the contractor for its services. Herodotus says that Cambyses' satrap Oroetes later lured Polycrates to his death by promising him great wealth – enough to rule all Hellas (3.122). If so, Polycrates may have been anticipating another mercenary commission from the Persians, and his death instead may well have been due to the failure of his promised fleet – already paid for by the Persians – to arrive in Egypt.

More generally, R.T. Hallock, *Persepolis Fortification Texts* (1969), nos. 1972–1980 and 2078, with commentary on pp. 8 and 61–63, shows that *praefecti castrorum* in Iranian territories also paid for their needs, but in kind. Forcible requisition or purchase was normally avoided, then, in the inner satrapies as well. Persian subventions for Greek naval construction and service are abundantly attested from the Ionian war onward,

Darius' naval policy in turn institutionalized the Ionians' profitable role. He introduced a genuine Persian coinage as part of his great administrative and financial reorganization of the empire, and his gold darics and silver sigloi supplanted the Lydian types in western Anatolia.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, in his reign the Persians opened a second mint in Ionia and copiously issued sigloi in particular,<sup>38</sup> so that it is hard to avoid the impression that this new coinage was meant for the expenses of the Persians' expeditions in Europe, in which the Ionians in their ships played so prominent a part.<sup>39</sup>

Some of this wealth passed out of Ionian hands via trade and tribute into Egypt, Syria, and the Persian interior. But the majority of coin finds – including early sigloi and darics – have occurred in or near the Greek areas of settlement in Anatolia. This coined wealth, then, generally did not gravitate into the palace treasury, as one could assume from Herodotus' summary description of Darius' accumulatory policy (3.96.2), but remained in Greek and Carian Asia Minor and the islands.

principally by Thucydides and Xenophon, who show the Persians subventing their Greek allies and calling upon their subjects to build ships and man them at need for specific campaigns (esp. Thuc. 8.87 on Tissaphernes' dealings with the Phoenician fleet, and Xen. *Hell.*, esp. 3.4.1, which attests that the Phoenicians built, housed, and manned their own vessels for the Persians, *contra* Wallinga, "Persian Navy" [as in n. 23] 70ff.).

Negatively Wallinga's case rests on the argument from silence that "in all the traditions concerning the Persian domination of the Asiatic Greeks and Phoenicians ... their supposed obligation to furnish ships is never mentioned in connection with the tribute" ("Persian Navy" 53). But Artaphernes' resurvey of Ionia to reassess the tribute (6.42) shows that it was a tax on the land: O. Murray, "Ὁ ἀρχαῖος δασμός," *Historia* 15 (1966) 142–156, esp. 149–153. Naval service, however, was paid for by the Persians themselves, from building and fitting out the ships to sustaining the crews on campaign. Herodotus' account of the Naxian expedition reflects this arrangement, with the Persians shouldering the principal expenses of fitting out the ships and furnishing troops (5.32, 34.3, 35.2). Normally, then, the Persians collected an annual tribute on the land, but paid for naval service and other such occasional services as the Samian engineer Mandrocles' construction of a boat-bridge spanning the Bosphorus (4.88–89.1). Services, including service in arms, and the tribute (cf. 3.67.3) must then have been separate accounts, without any necessary relationship to one another.

37 Kraay, *Coins* (as in n. 1) 32f.

38 Kraay, "The Asyut Hoard: Some Comments on Chronology," *NC* 1977 (7th ser. 17) 194, based on the contemporary circulation of two distinct types of siglos: E.S.G. Robinson, "Two Greek Coin Hoards," *NC* 1960 (6th ser. 20) 31ff. on the sigloi of types a and b in the Smyrna hoard of ca. 500: *Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards*<sup>2</sup>, M. Thompson, O. Morkholm, and Kraay, edd. (1973) 1166; henceforth *Inventory*.

39 Kraay, *Coins* (as in n. 1) 33 comments that "the evidence of hoards shows clearly that the siglos circulated only in western Anatolia, an area where the use of coinage was well established among the Greeks and their neighbors, and it is likely that the mint of Sardis continued to be the principal source of these coins."

Samos is an especially significant case for judging the impact of this new wealth on the economic condition of Persian Ionia. The island's prosperity had been injured when Darius violently imposed the tyrant Syloson (ca. 514–511); but tradition exaggerated the degree of injury, and Samian prosperity was not long interrupted.<sup>40</sup> Between the Persian conquest of Thrace and the Ionian revolt the Samians issued a large number of silver drachmas on a standard designed to be interchangeable with Athenian and Cyrenean coins. This issue corresponds in prominence to issues of the previous period of Samian prosperity under Polycrates. It was designed to serve the needs of the Samians' overseas trade, and not for tribute to the Great King.<sup>41</sup>

All these facts argue that the Persian presence in the Levant and Europe redirected, rather than depressed, the Ionian economy. The Persians replaced, rather than destroyed, the Ionians' Lydian and Egyptian markets for luxuries and mercenaries, and offered new opportunities to the Ionians by integrating them into their empire as the naval arm of their advance into Europe and the Aegean archipelago. It is in the great strains caused by this process, and not in the chimaera of Ionian impoverishment, that we will find the causes of the great insurrection.<sup>42</sup>

## II. Miletus and Persia

Among their Greeks the Persians most favored the Milesians, who benefited most of all when Darius granted them possession of Myrkinos, at the ford of the lower Strymon river in Thrace. This was the most valuable unexploited site in the Aegean basin. Also known as *Ennea Hodoi* or "Nine Roads," it was the gateway to the upper Strymon valley and a strategic control point for the landward communications of the whole of Persian Thrace (5.11.2, 23). Near this site the Athenians were to found Amphipolis, which became their depot for the mines of Pangaeus; later, Philip of Macedon established there his second main mint.<sup>43</sup> The importance of Myrkinos to the Milesians is revealed by the unprecedented decision of Miletus' ruler to become its *ktistes* and make his headquarters there: in Myrkinos Histiaeus must obviously have seen the future of Miletus itself.

At the outset of his story of her fall, Herodotus, ever mindful of peripety, memorialized Miletus as the greatest state of Greece in Asia (5.28), and therefore

40 G. Shipley, *A History of Samos 800–188 B.C.* (1987) 104–107.

41 J.P. Barron, *The Silver Coins of Samos* (1966) 38–49.

42 Roebuck, *CAH*<sup>2</sup> IV. (as in n. 13) 452–53.

43 J. Papastavru, "Amphipolis, Geschichte und Prosopographie," *Klio*, Beiheft 37 (1936) 9–14; Philip's mint: *ibid.* 38, and Griffith in N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* (1978) II.355; henceforth *HM*. For tribal movements, *ibid.* 55–58 with maps on pp. 66, 67, 128.

of the Greek world at this time. Her advantages had induced the Lydian kings and Cyrus the Persian in turn to make her their ally (1.22.4, 143 init., 169). These were her commanding fortifications (6.18), her leading role in Ionian commerce, and her foundation of more than forty colonies in the Hellespont, Bosphorus, and Black Sea – an area of great strategic significance to the Persians.<sup>44</sup> Miletus could not have supplied the whole populations of these foundations herself. Hers was the leading role of exploration and organization, as at Myrkinos (5.23). It is probable that her activity in this sphere was a major factor in raising her to the hegemonic position which her tyrants exploited under the Persians.

Finally, the Milesians possessed Didyma, the greatest oracular shrine of Greek Asia, whose servants were drawn from the most influential families at Miletus. Apollo of Didyma played an important role in Milesian politics, as he did among the other Ionians and Aeolians, who solicited responses on important public questions (cf. 1.157ff.). In a word, Didyma was to archaic Ionia what Delphi was to the Greeks of Europe.<sup>45</sup>

The city's power, religious prestige, and ramifying communications in the East Mediterranean and Black Sea placed her in a privileged category of strategically situated peoples in the Persian empire who did not pay tribute.<sup>46</sup> The Milesians themselves pursued the obvious and profitable policy of committing their city to the service of the Persians' expansionist goals, which lay in just those areas of paramount interest to the Milesians themselves: the Pontus, Thrace, and the Cyclades.

The Milesian tyranny itself was an independent native dynasty within the empire,<sup>47</sup> like the Syennesis dynasty of Cilicia, the kings of Macedon and

44 F. Bilabel, "Die ionische Kolonisation," *Philologus*, Suppl. 14 (1920) 60, arrived at a total of 45 Milesian foundations "mit einiger Sicherheit."

45 Georges, *Barbarian Asia* (as in n. 1) 17, 25–28. Two stories we possess about Didyma in the archaic period indicate that the oracle was a mouthpiece for the policies of the ruling circles at Miletus; the first concerns an episode of stasis crowned by a tyranny (Heracleides Ponticus ap. Athenaeus 524b = fr. 50 Wehrli, cf. Berve, *Tyrannis* [as in n. 1] 102 and 579), and the second attests to their collaboration with Persia after the conquest of Cyrus (1.157ff.; cf. T.S. Brown, "Aristodicus of Cyme and the Branchidae," *AJP* 99 [1978] 70).

46 These included the Beduin of the Syrian desert, who possessed the road to Egypt (4.4.3, 7.2) and were impossible to control securely. They were among those few subject peoples whom Darius allowed to tender formal "gifts", i.e., tokens of loyalty, instead of an imposed tribute. The others were the Aethiopians living above the cataracts of the Nile and the peoples of Colchis and the Caucasus (3.91.1 and 97): i.e., the inhabitants of the distant and porous frontier areas along the routes of invasion into the Nile valley and the Iranian plateau itself. The Uxii, a hill tribe that threatened the Susa-Persepolis route, was even paid subsidies by the crown to allow safe passage between these Persian capitals (Arrian *Anab.* 3.17; I owe the reference to Professor E. Badian).

47 Berve, *Tyrannis* (as in n. 1) 102, 579f. The family probably belonged to the priestly association of Molpoi who served Apollo Didymaeus; the father of Histiaeus' son-in-law and first cousin was named Molpagoras (5.30.2) and a statue dedication by a Histiaeus

Cyprus, and the later Hecatomnids of Caria.<sup>48</sup> These native rulers stood in contrast to the Achaemenid Persian satraps set over peoples, such as the Babylonians, Phrygians, and Lydians, shorn of their own dynasties by the Persians. In acquiescing to the Great King's overlordship these native rulers nonetheless expected the respect due to their independent legitimacy. It was for this reason that Evagoras of Salamis in the fourth century was to demand of the Persian emperor that he obey only as a king to a king.<sup>49</sup> We shall see that Herodotus' account of Aristagoras' dealings with the Persian grandees Artaphrenes and Megabates is best understood in this light, of Aristagoras' own similar consciousness of his independent position.

### III. The Background of the Revolt

Herodotus drew on a version of events that blamed the catastrophe chiefly on the Milesians and their tyrants. It would be easy to conclude directly that he accepted this material because it fit his own strong prejudice against the Milesians,<sup>50</sup> were it not for the fact that his account of Aristagoras and Histiaeus closely fits what we know about the Persian system from other sources. At bottom, his account treats the outbreak of the revolt as a *Persian* phenomenon – the product of a rivalry for the Great King's favor and patronage. The political relations between Persians and Greeks, as well as among the Achaemenid nobility itself, amounted essentially to a competitive scramble up the greasy pole of imperial favor. The King balanced personal rivalries to cancel out possible combinations against himself. Imperial favor for services rendered was institutionalized in a formally preserved roll of "King's Benefactors" (8.85

from this period stood in the processional way at Didyma (*SIG*<sup>3</sup> no. 3f. = M.N. Tod, *SGHI*, vol. 1 no. 9). See G. De Sanctis in *Studi in onore di Pietro Bonfante* ii (1930) 669–680; also N. Robertson, "Government and Society at Miletus, 525–442 B.C.," *Phoenix* 41 (1987) 375–77, who cogently dates the oligarchy installed by Parian mediators to 525/4 B.C., when the list of *aesemnytae* of the Molpoi begins. But his thesis that the tyranny was then installed or inspired by the Persians ignores Miletus' special relationship with Persia, which Darius continued.

48 S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (1982) 137ff. on the Hecatomnids. For Syennesis: Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.12, 21–27, 4.4; cf. How and Wells, *Commentary* (as in n. 1) 1.94, ad 1.74.3. For Macedon see Hammond in *HM* (as in n. 43) II (1979) 59f., 64, 68f., 98–101, excepting his unwarranted conclusion that "Bubares ... was effectively in charge of Macedonia, perhaps for a decade after c. 510" (p. 60).

49 Diod. 15.9.2; cf. Isoc. 9.63f. and, for a theoretical explanation of the nature of such a relationship, Chrysantas' speech at Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.3–4: Chrysantas' views refer to the relationship between the King and his Persian satraps and minister; but, as I argue below, analogous relationships were open to non-Persians.

50 B.M. Mitchell, "Herodotus and Samos," *JHS* 95 (1975) 87–90.

fin.).<sup>51</sup> Thus it was natural for Herodotus' Asiatic Greek informants to conclude that Darius had favored Histiaeus and the Milesians with a place, Myrkinos, that Herodotus describes as a bone in the throat of Megabazus, Darius' own viceroy in Thrace (5.23).<sup>52</sup>

All this implies that Greeks of Histiaeus' status, tyrants of major Greek *poleis*, could attain status identities within the Persian system comparable to those of high-ranking Persians, at least in the eyes of Ionians before the revolt and the Persian Wars. Such possibilities could well have been especially rich under Darius, a usurper who was open to new men. To secure his rule he had put down revolts throughout the empire and needed to construct from scratch a personal network of new alliances, not only among the Persian nobility, but also among the provincials. In Ionia he rid himself of at least one high personage who had served Cyrus and Cambyses, namely Oroetes (3.127–28), and put his half-brother Artaphrenes in charge. Likewise Mitrobates, Cambyses' satrap at Dascyleium, disappears from Herodotus' account, to be replaced by Darius' close associate Megabazus (3.120.2; 4.143.2).<sup>53</sup>

On the same lines, Darius created personal relations of dependency and reward among the Greek and Carian tyrants. Histiaeus himself became *ktistes* of Myrkinos while uniquely remaining titular tyrant of Miletus; thereafter he became a *syssitos* and *symbolos* of Darius at Susa (5.24.4) as well, with direct access to his person. Such a multiple status identity, including a titular place at the imperial table, conferred very high rank in an imperial system justly characterized by Pierre Briant as both highly personal and graded by a scale of allocations of food and drink from the ruler to his servants.<sup>54</sup>

Histiaeus at Susa was not a pampered political prisoner. Here and elsewhere, Herodotus' account is visibly influenced by the memory of Histiaeus' and Aristagoras' public posturings. In this case Herodotus' sources appear based on Histiaeus' inventions concerning his alleged deception of Darius to escape a

51 Well recognized by Michael N. Weiskopf, *Achaemenid Systems of Governing in Anatolia* (Diss. U. California at Berkeley: 1982), 35–38, 43f., 46–49, 58–62.

52 However, it is illegitimate to conclude from this, as does Blamire (as in n. 108) *CQ* n.s. 9 (1959) 143, that Histiaeus (and Coes of Mytilene) "chose as they were instructed to choose" by Darius. Myrkinos was crucial to Milesian ambitions. Blamire correctly notes that Darius installed Histiaeus at the Strymon ford *Schwerpunkt* instead of "a regular Persian governor, from whom he might well have had more to fear." Similarly St. Heinlein, "Histaïos von Milet," *Klio* 9 (1909) 345f. For a parallel instance in Herodotus of an imperial gift chosen by the beneficiary (which also turned out badly for the chooser) see 9.109ff.

53 A secure inference: 5.15, 23.1 and 98.1 together show that Megabazus settled captive populations in Pontic Phrygia when he retired from Thrace. Late in the revolt the satrap at Dascyleium was a son of Megabazus, Oebares (6.33.3). Cf A.T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (1948) 148.

54 P. Briant, "Table du roi, tribut et redistribution chez les Achéménides," in: P. Briant – C. Herrenschmidt (ed.), *Le tribut dans l'Empire perse* (1989), 35–44.

gilded captivity devised by his Persian nemesis Megabazus (5.23.2f., 35.4, 106 f.) and his claim to have authored the rebellion (6.2f.), which had long since been publicly imputed to him by Aristagoras (5.35).

When Histiaeus arrived in Ionia he was, however, promptly arrested by the Chians as an agent of Darius (5.23.2f., 35.4; 6.2.2). For certainly that is just what he was. Why else would Darius send him to Ionia at the very moment when he could do most harm? And before this, when his rivalry with Megabazus over the spoils of Persian Thrace had erupted, Darius had treated him with the most conspicuous honor, in removing both men while rewarding each of them highly. To Megabazus he awarded the satrapy of Pontic Phrygia – while separating him from the wealth of Thrace. Histiaeus and the Milesians kept Myrkinos (5.124.2ff.), and Histiaeus' new place in the imperial household – not much inferior to those personages who occupied the offices of King's Groom (3.85–89; cf. 6.33.3) and King's Cupbearer (3.34.1) – raised him at a stroke to the pinnacle of influence among the Greeks of the empire.<sup>55</sup>

Darius trusted Histiaeus highly enough to dispatch him to Ionia in the midst of the insurrection, and Herodotus' notice of the public honor Darius paid him posthumously cannot be a fiction (6.30.2). Indeed, it contradicts Herodotus' own portrait of him as the true instigator of the revolt – a portrait based on the story of the Tattooed Slave (5.36), on Histiaeus' own representations to the Ionians (6.2–3), and on Artaphrenes' accusation that he instigated the revolt (6.1), which Artaphrenes must have given out as the ground for executing him (cf. 6.1.2).

Aristagoras in his turn collaborated with Artaphrenes to win the Cyclades for Miletus under Persian overlordship (5.31).<sup>56</sup> One obvious attraction of the Cyclades was the rich silver mines of Siphnos.<sup>57</sup> Here the Milesians' Aegean ambitions merged with their possession of Myrkinos, which lay athwart the land communications of Thasos' rich coastal peraea and that island's colonies, through which the Thasians were gaining access to the silver of Thrace.<sup>58</sup> The Thasian foundations of Galepsos, Oesyne, Apollonia, Neapolis, Stryme, and

55 So Balcer, *Sparda* (as in n. 1) 228. Cf. Ctesias *FGrHist* 688 F 14.41: Megabyzus son of Zopyrus I conqueror of Babylon is a *homotrapezos* of Artaxerxes I.

56 Miletus' longstanding interest in the Cyclades appears in the legend that Neleus, the founder of Miletus, settled some of his followers on Naxos and commanded his sons to conquer the Cyclades (Aelian *VH* 8.5; Zenob. *Adag.* 5.17). A Milesian and Erythraean attack on Naxos occurred some time in the archaic period (Andriscus *FGrHist* 500 F 1 and Plut. *De mul. virt.* 17).

57 On these mines see Wagner et al. in P.T. Craddock, ed., *Scientific Studies in Early Mining and Extractive Technology* (British Museum Occasional Paper 20: 1980); G.A. Wagner and G. Weisgerber, The Ancient Silver Mine at Ayos Sostis on Siphnos (Greece), *Archaeo-Physika* 10 (1979) 209–222.

58 Kraay, *Coins* (as in n. 1) 149 with J. Pouilloux, *Recherches sur l'histoire et les cultes de Thasos i* (1954) 13f., 33f.

Skapte Hyle (a famous gold mine: 6.46.3) all lay in the 20-kilometer coastal and valley corridor between Myrkinos and Krenides (the mining center later renamed Philippi by its Macedonian conqueror Philip; its wealth furnished the means of Philip's further conquests). Thasos itself was a colony of Paros and could look to her Parian kinsmen for help if needed against the Milesians on the Strymon.<sup>59</sup> Conversely Milesian domination of the Cyclades was the key to a Milesian advance against Thasos and her silver-rich possessions in Thrace.

Seen in this light, it appears clear that, apart from the other gains of conquest, the Milesians were envisioning a "resource war" to gain control under Persian suzerainty of all the major sources of silver in the Aegean. Attica too, in particular the silver mines at Laurium on her southeast coast facing Ceos, would be vulnerable once the Cyclades were in the hands of Persia's Ionian collaborators, who now included the Peisistratids at Sigeion in the Troad (5.65.2, al.). The Naxian campaign would thus advance a principal aim of Darius' Scythian and Thracian campaigns: control of all the sources of precious metals in Persian Europe. Herodotus' notice that Artaphrenes doubled the scale of the operation before seeking the Great King's approval (5.31.4) is consistent with the fit of this campaign into Darius' earlier gains in Europe. The Milesians and Persians were hand in glove.

But Darius sowed the seed of failure and revolt by saddling Aristagoras with an Achaemenid rival, one Megabates, a cousin whom the King appointed to command the troop contingents of Persians and other non-Greeks with the triremes (5.32 fin. – 33 init.).<sup>60</sup> Here once again is a Persian grandee pitted against a Milesian ruler, rivalries which are at the core of Herodotus' entire causal scheme of the revolt. The fact that tells us his scheme is not a topos but the reality is Megabates' identity. He is virtually certain to have been a son of Megabazus, Histiaeus' rival in Thrace and now the satrap at Dascyleium.<sup>61</sup>

To Darius Megabates may have been the obvious choice, since it not only furthered the rivalry between the Milesian tyrants and the family of Megabazus but also impinged upon Artaphrenes. Instances of rivalry between the satraps of Phrygia and those of Ionia are so common in the Greek historical sources that we can infer it to have been a permanent state of affairs virtually from the beginning of Persian rule in Asia Minor (cf. 3.120.2).<sup>62</sup>

59 Herodotus (5.31.2) speaks of the Cyclades as "hanging upon" Naxos, i.e., dependent, naming specifically Andros and Paros. On the continuing strong relationship between Paros and her daughter Thasos, probably including isopolity, see Pouilloux, *Recherches* (as in n. 58) 22–34 and A.J. Graham, *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece* (1964), 74f., 81–90.

60 Herodotus says that Artaphrenes, not Darius, appointed Megabates (5.32); but this contradicts everything else we are told about Persian practice: the King always appointed the commander of major operations. Hdt. 5.32 is, I believe, unique in the whole corpus of evidence on this point, both Greek and Persian (e.g., DB Kent [as in n. 65] II 18ff. on the "rebellions").

61 See Appendix A.

62 See Weiskopf, *Achaemenid Systems* (as in n. 51) 349–353.



If Darius wanted to create divisions as a check on the high command of a huge campaign carried out in his absence, then his choice of Megabates succeeded all too well. Greek and Persian fell out, the campaign failed spectacularly, and the story arose that Megabates himself had betrayed the expedition. The story is plausible in the context of their personal enmity; Herodotus reports it baldly as a fact (5.33.4) – though it is hard to believe that Megabates himself ruined a project so dear to his King as well as to his own prospects.<sup>63</sup> To accuse Megabates before Artaphrenes would have served Aristagoras handily to play upon any suspicions Artaphrenes might already have nursed against his cousin and rival satrap at Dascyleium. The alleged betrayal of Megabates therefore belongs with other elements of an exaggerated, but not fundamentally mistaken, version of events that saw the Megabazids, and afterwards Artaphrenes, consciously manoeuvring to destroy the power of the Milesian tyrants in Thrace and Ionia, and to end the city's anomalous independence.

This version was retrojected, perhaps to blame Megabazus for engineering Histiaeus' removal from Myrkinos to Susa, but almost certainly to (falsely) assign to Histiaeus the order to revolt (5.35.2ff.). This version also emphasizes the later enmity between Histiaeus and Artaphrenes (6.1–4). Undoubtedly, therefore, this reading of events from Histiaeus' sojourn at Susa onward arose at Miletus, and was later reinforced by Histiaeus' own necessary lies to the Ionians (6.1–3).

Megabates challenged Aristagoras' authority at the outset of the campaign by punishing a ship captain among the Greeks, who was under Aristagoras' direct command, and spurning Aristagoras' private request to free the man. Aristagoras then countered by publicly insisting, correctly, that Megabates had overstepped his authority, inasmuch as the overall command of the armada was his, Aristagoras', and his alone (5.33). Herodotus presents these as facts heard by many in open quarrel; they have therefore a claim to reliability. In an oriental empire, in which ceremony and protocol defined status, a public quarrel between grandees was a major event in itself. Even the name of Megabates' victim was remembered – one Scylax of Myndus.

Aristagoras' assumption of equality of status and superiority in command over an Achaemenid may seem preposterous in the light of what the Persian

63 Far more probably the betrayer was a Greek, for profit, private friendship, or fear and envy of Miletus' power. The Samians in particular were historical enemies of the Milesians (cf. 3.38.4; Thuc. 1.115.2), and under Polycrates, late uncle of the present Samian tyrant Aeaces (6.13 init.), had achieved something of the position in the Cyclades that Aristagoras was now attempting: see G.L. Huxley, *The Early Ionians* (1966) 125f. Megabates' subsequent career appears to bear the marks of his failure in this command. He was to hold no other known command, and Xerxes was eventually to remove him from his satrapy at Dascyleium when it became necessary to deal with another Aristagoras-figure, Pausanias of Sparta (Thuc. 1.129.1; cf. Hdt. 5.32).

inscriptions and monuments tell us about Achaemenid imperial attitudes, and what the Greek sources themselves tell us about Greeks used and flattered – but not conspicuously elevated – by the Persians in the greatly changed circumstances after the Ionian Revolt and the Persian Wars. In the fourth century, however, Xenophon of Athens – one of the many Greeks who sought their fortunes in the Persian empire – testifies to the ambitions the best of them could harbor for imperial advancement.<sup>64</sup> Aristagoras' view of his own position, then, has a strong claim on historical truth. Herodotus, whose world this was after all, sees nothing anomalous in Aristagoras' status even though he wrote long after the events had transformed relations between Persians and Greeks. Aristagoras was an Ionian in command of an Ionian armada, and his kinsman Histiaeus had been conspicuously elevated by Darius. In sum, we have another testimony to the high status plateau on which Ionians like Histiaeus and Aristagoras could place themselves, because to all appearances they were placed there by the Great King himself.

Megabates' attempt to usurp Aristagoras' control of the fleet and the expedition was not only a direct attack on Aristagoras' face *vis-à-vis* the other Greeks. It threatened Aristagoras' mutual understanding with Artaphrenes that he, Aristagoras, and the Milesians would have the leading role in the conquered Cyclades (5.30.2ff.). Moreover, Megabates treated Aristagoras not as a ruler in his own right and an ally, but as if he were an imperial *bandaka* – a direct “slave-subject” of the emperor and his officers, including himself.<sup>65</sup> Thereby Megabates brought into question not only Aristagoras' status but the fundamental basis of Miletus' formally egalitarian friendship and alliance with Persia.

With the failure of the campaign and Artaphrenes' shift from alliance to enmity Aristagoras' concerns became immediate. Fearing that he would be deprived of his *basileien* (*sic*: 5.35.1) of Miletus, says Herodotus, Aristagoras now weighed insurrection while – a seemingly providential coincidence – the Tattooed Slave bearing the purported message from Histiaeus to revolt appeared on cue (5.35.1–2).

As for Artaphrenes, the failure at Naxos was his own as well; he had forwarded the scheme to Darius and had every motive to shift the blame. He could not remove Aristagoras, whose authority depended on Histiaeus' delegation

64 Georges, *Barbarian Asia* (as in n. 1) 221–241.

65 *Bandaka*: R.G. Kent, *Old Persian*<sup>2</sup> (1953) s.v. on p. 199 col. 2. From a root meaning “bond, fetter”; the word is found only in Darius' Bisitun inscription, where he applies it uniformly to his generals (kDB Kent II 30, 49 f., 82; III 13, 31, 56, 84f.), including two of the Seven: Hydarnes (II 19f.) and Gobryas (V 7f). Xenophon thus knowledgeably calls Cyrus the Younger a *doulos* of his brother the emperor (*Anab.* 1.9.29). This evidence on usage appears to limit its application to Persian subordinates of high rank; the possibility exists, therefore, that the word properly indicates only a relationship of personal service between the King and other Persians, and should not be extended to denote conditions, which varied, of subordination of other peoples and their rulers to the King.

(5.30.2: Aristagoras accordingly feared he would be deposed, not by Artaphrenes, but by order of Histiaeus from Susa).<sup>66</sup> Instead, Artaphrenes demanded reimbursement of the cost of the failed campaign from the bankrupt (5.34.3). Aristagoras, since in any case recovery of imperial monies would go far to put things right from Darius' perspective.<sup>67</sup>

From the Milesian viewpoint, however, Artaphrenes had got the Ionian ships, men, and service he had paid for; it was not their fault that the campaign had failed – it was all Megabates' doing. Besides, to the Milesians Artaphrenes' demand also approached extortion of tribute, and was of a piece with Megabates' former threat to the Milesians' status. As Artaphrenes had intended, moreover, his demand also undermined Aristagoras' personal position within Miletus in two ways. Not only did Artaphrenes open Aristagoras to attacks by personal enemies and worried neutrals alike within Miletus, but he could only raise the insupportable sum demanded by dunning the general wealth of the Milesian citizens – the very men who had wasted the summer on an ambitiously advertised campaign which had brought them nothing.

We can illuminate Aristagoras' situation from analogies with other episodes in Greek political history. It resembles, first of all, Miltiades' predicament after he had led the Athenians to wage the futile expedition of 489 against Paros. The Athenians prosecuted Miltiades as he lay dying and levied on him an enormous fine, which represented his public restitution for the expenses of the campaign to avoid a sentence of death (6.132–136).<sup>68</sup> In a similar case Aristagoras could only make his position worse if he were to try to raise from the Milesians the monies in question. In this sense Artaphrenes had made Aristagoras' decision to revolt for him; it remained only to convince his own faction that he possessed Histiaeus' authority to revolt. For this purpose he introduced the Tattooed Slave

66 This follows as well from the fact that the Naxians whose restoration was the original aim of the campaign were *xeinoi* of Histiaeus (ibid.). Histiaeus' advice therefore must presumably have been sought by Darius, and the failure of the campaign reflected on Histiaeus indirectly. He would naturally seek to remove Aristagoras as the author of the failure.

67 Cf. Tissaphernes' orders from the King to collect arrears of tribute from the Ionians, after he was prevented from doing so because of the Athenians: Thuc. 8.5.4 with A.W. Gomme et al., *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, ad loc. at V (1981) 12–16. Thucydides puts this command forward as the reason why Tissaphernes began dealing with the Peloponnesians against the Athenians.

68 The siege of Paros involved seventy Athenian ships with their crews and lasted twenty-six days (6.132, 135.1). Miltiades arrived in Athens in 493 from the Chersonese in four triremes (6.41.1–2), the earliest notice we have of the Athenians' acquaintance with this new type of ship. If Miltiades' ships were triremes, the baseline cost of the siege of Paros would have amounted to 200 men x 70 ships x 26 days = 364,000 man-days' ephodia. Miltiades' fifty-talent fine (136.3) = 300,000 drachmas, or some five obols per man per day, which could break down to three obols a day per man, with the rest representing the other costs of the expedition.

– an evidently notorious figure in the story – as having come from Histiaeus (5.35.2–36.1).<sup>69</sup>

Aristagoras' dilemma, moreover, could be exploited both by rivals for supreme power and by advocates of free politics within Miletus. Aristagoras needed to preserve his own authority, and his next course of action resembles the strategy of Cleisthenes of Athens, when he too was on the verge of political extinction. By putting himself at the head of the forces for change, Cleisthenes had saved himself in a contest for personal power in a city where the desire for political liberation was widely shared but hitherto impotent. As Cleisthenes had recently done, Aristagoras opportunely championed the cause of *isonomia* and, probably, converted his tyranny to a magistracy to see the new regime into being (5.37.2).<sup>70</sup> Thereby, like Cleisthenes, he preserved the influence of his family in Milesian politics.<sup>71</sup>

#### IV. The Ionian Tyrants

Aristagoras began the movement toward insurrection by exploiting a general revulsion against the tyrants whom Darius had put over many of the Greeks in the course of imposing his grip on all quarters of his empire. Herodotus is definite on this point, which has never been disputed. What needs explanation is Darius' tyrant policy from his own perspective. For although monarchy was the universal form of government in the oriental lands of the Persians' empire, nominated tyrants had not flourished in Ionia under Cyrus and Cambyses.<sup>72</sup> The

69 How and Wells, *Commentary* (as in n. 1) II.14 ad 5.35.2 comment, "Herodotus speaks as if this slave were a well-known character like the man in the iron mask"; this obviously "folkloric" episode is easily classified under the topos of "smuggling a message from Susa" (cf. 5.52, 1.123.4, 7.239.2–4), and has never borne credence among scholars. But humans do often think and act in "folkloric" ways, else we would have no folklore. Aristagoras need only to have had Histiaeus' messenger tattooed through his hair to avoid having to forge a dispatch, with its seals and perhaps its distinctive hand and style. Aristagoras could then have produced him, first to his partisans and then to the Milesians in assembly, in a convincing *coup de théâtre*.

70 An earlier Milesian tyrant, presumably Thrasybulus, had occupied the chief annual magistracy, the *prytaneia* (Ar. Pol. 1305a8).

71 Aristagoras' brother was *strategos* of the Milesians at Sardis (5.99.2); and when Aristagoras left Miletus, he was succeeded by a member of his own faction (5.126.1), while he himself became governor of Myrkinos with the command of a force of Milesians. On Cleisthenes and the Alcmaeonids' position see D.M. Lewis, "Cleisthenes and Attica," *Historia* 12 (1963) 22–40; P.J. Bicknell, "Kleisthenes as Politician: An Exploration," in *Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy* (*Historia Einzelschriften* Heft 19, 1972) 1–53; B. Develin and M. Kilmer, "What Kleisthenes Did," *Historia* 46 (1997) 3–18.

72 Cf. Balcer, *Sparda* (as in n. 1) 207f. on Darius' vassal tyrants. Before Darius, Berve, *Tyrannis* finds only Pytharchus of Cyzicus, erroneously (from Agathocles *FGrHist* 472 F

Ionians' first revolt against a dictated subjugation had taught Cyrus – as their second revolt was to teach Darius – that this peculiar (cf. 7.147.1) and belligerent people would not long suffer the loss of their autonomy, which in any case did not limit the broader authority of Persian rule, and could be made to work in the Persian interest.

Cyrus had been accepted by both Persians and Medes and was able to secure his rule without prolonged warfare and widespread purges, to the extent that the change from one kindred imperial people to the other had gone largely unremarked among the Greeks, who went on calling the Persians "Medes".<sup>73</sup> The age of vassal tyrants begins with the usurper Darius because tyrants were a natural extension of the means by which he and his junta had ruthlessly imposed themselves upon the rest of the empire. These means required, first of all, the replacement of all those identified with the former regime with men dependent upon himself.

Darius' Bisitun Inscription,<sup>74</sup> versions of which were disseminated throughout the provinces,<sup>75</sup> describes revolts in all the key provinces from Mesopotamia eastwards, except Bactria, following the coup against Bardiya.<sup>76</sup> Darius had to reconquer the Iranian and Mesopotamian core of the empire piecemeal, and he extirpated *foci* of resistance by atrocious means, which he took care to advertise in his own voice. Darius relates that he cut off the nose, ears and tongue, and put out one eye of the captured leader of the resistance in Media. He then exhibited him at the gate of the palace at Ecbatana, together with the flayed and stuffed skins of other prominent captives, and afterward had him impaled.<sup>77</sup> The Sagartian leader suffered the same mutilations and death, and the Babylonian leaders were also impaled.<sup>78</sup>

6, cf. Heraclides Ponticus *FHG* II 217, fr. 11.5), Athenagoras and Comes in Ephesus (*Suda* s.v. Athenagoras) before Darius. The evidence does not state that Athenagoras and Comes came to power through Cyrus; of all Asiatic Greek cities Ephesus was most accustomed to tyranny (Berve, *ibid.* 98–100 with 576–578). As for Pytharchus, Agathocles says only that he was a friend of Cyrus who had given him seven "cities" (he names only six: the small places of Pedasus, Olympium, Acamantium, Sceptra, Artepsus, and Tortora), and comments that "he in his arrogance and folly undertook to tyrannize his fatherland, gathering an army. But the Cyzicenes charged out against him, facing in serried ranks the danger." Obviously the Cyzicenes overcame Pytharchus, who had been established as a private magnate only by Cyrus' gift.

73 I.M. Diakonoff, "Media," *CHI* II (1985), 142–148; J.M. Cook, "The Rise of the Achae-menids and Establishment of their Empire," *ibid.*, 216f., 278–280; D.F. Graf, "Medism: the Origin and Significance of the Term," *JHS* 104 (1984) 15–20.

74 R.G. Kent, *Old Persian*<sup>2</sup> (1953) DB I 35–IV 43.

75 *Ibid.* IV 90f.

76 *Ibid.* IV 1ff.

77 *Ibid.* II 70–91.

78 *Ibid.* III 88–92.

Darius was a provincial from Persis,<sup>79</sup> whose father Hystaspes had been in charge of Parthia at the time of the usurpation.<sup>80</sup> Except for a doubtfully attested period of service in Cambyses' retinue in Egypt (3.139.22), Darius' career before the Scythian expedition had not brought him to the West and he had no experience of Greeks beyond those exiles and self-seekers whose patter Herodotus knowledgeably caricatures in his portraits of Syloson (3.139–141), Democedes (3.134ff.), and the Pisistratids (7.7). Greeks such as these had no interest in educating the King in the peculiar character of their people. Moreover, much of the Persians' previous experience with Greeks had died with men, such as Oroetes, who had become culturally acclimated to the western satrapies in the service of Cyrus and Cambyses. These men Darius overcame and replaced with inexperienced men of violence like Artaphrenes and Megabates.

Thus Darius and his generals installed loyalists wherever they deemed it necessary in Ionia, notably including the major island states of Ionia, which were not accessible to the Persians' power by land. Together with Miletus, the island cities of Mytilene, Chios, and Samos formed the core of the Persians' Aegean navy (cf. 6.8). The Mytileneans had enjoyed free government when they elected a certain Coes their strategos for the Scythian campaign, whom Darius returned as their tyrant. The Chians, for their part, had possessed a public council, courts, and magistrates responsive to the rhetras of the *demos* by the mid-sixth century<sup>81</sup> and probably continued to enjoy free government down to the long tyranny of Strattis, again probably established under Darius. The Chians were to fight to the end at Lade against his reimposition (6.15).<sup>82</sup> Samos, however, had been under a tyranny uninterruptedly at least since the accession of Polycrates (ca. 540 or later); but the return of the Polycratids under Syloson and his son after Lade was deeply resented by the propertied classes especially (6.22.1).

Hitherto in Ionia tyrannies had arisen from within the cities themselves as the outcome of contests of prestige and power among nobles. These tyrannies were therefore likely to reflect, and respond to, the real balance and direction of social and political forces, and to feature those policies of magnificent display and civic patronage that appealed to the many. Moreover, tyranny was a prize that could change hands. But Darius' clients broke the old rules of the game in the cities. Instead of securing popular favor by benefactions and liturgies these tyrants were responsible for quite the opposite task of collecting the dues of tribute and services which Darius had now established. The new system stood

79 Ibid. I 1–3; cf. Hdt. 1.209.2.

80 Ibid. II 92–III 9.

81 Meiggs and Lewis, *SGHI* no. 8 with commentary.

82 The very longevity of Strattis' tyranny, which lasted more than thirty years to 479 (4.138, 8.132.2; cf. Berve, *Tyrannis* [as in n. 1] 106f.), makes it likely that it was inaugurated in this period under Darius (4.138.2).

in demeaning contrast to the “gifts” called for by his predecessors. For gifts, though expected at a given scale of magnificence, could vary with circumstances; more importantly, gifts preserved the dignity of the donor and established an obligation of reciprocity on the part of the recipient.<sup>83</sup> And Darius’ tyrants could hold power indefinitely by virtue of Persian support alone. It is not accidental that Syloson’s return to power under Darius, for example, is explained by a fairy-tale anecdote of Syloson’s gift of his cloak to the then obscure Darius – a story of the kind that relates miraculous rewards for humans who befriend deities in disguise (3.139–141).

The mainland Ionians had lived under a tributary regime since Croesus’ time, but not under client tyrannies before Darius. The islanders had not paid tribute to the Lydians, as they had lain outside Lydian power, and probably not to the Persians either before Darius arrived in Ionia to organize the Scythian expedition, if we are to judge by Herodotus’ account of Polycrates of Samos (esp. 3.120–125). Thus the islanders, unlike the mainlanders, had borne the imposts which their tyrants demanded for Susa probably for not much more than a decade, and must accordingly have resented these all the more. Even the material benefits which accrued to the Greeks themselves under Darius and his predecessors contributed to unrest by enlarging the possessing classes, when elsewhere in Greece a rising prosperity was creating a stronger climate for free politics.

Finally, the matter of these tyrants’ style needs to be considered in the light of their close association with the Persians. Before the Persians the magnificent style of the Ionian tyrants was modeled on the fashions of the Lydian court, when Sardis had been the Versailles of the Aegean Greek world.<sup>84</sup> Thucydides’ lurid picture of the Medizing Spartan renegade, Pausanias, suggests that aping Achaemenid magnificence had been, and continued to be, attractive if not *de rigueur* among the tyrants of Persian Ionia. The accusers of the Spartan renegade Pausanias had claimed that he not only conspired with Xerxes to enslave Greece, but even cast off his Spartan-ness to play the barbarian. Thucydides (1.130) relates that

“When Pausanias received this letter [from Xerxes, promising ample support for his alleged project to subject Greece to Persia] ... he was far more elated and could no longer bear to live in the customary way, but would go forth from Byzantium [which he held as a private adventurer] in Median apparel and travel through Thrace accompanied by a guard of Medes and Egyptians; he banqueted in the Persian style and all in all could not conceal his

83 Well treated by H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, *Yauna en Persai: Grieken en Perzen in een ander perspectief* (Diss. Leiden: 1980) 145. See also Balcer, *Sparda* (as in n. 1) 207; for the degree of possible Persian administrative penetration in Western Asia, *ibid.*, 169–194.

84 Georges, *Barbarian Asia* (as in n. 1) ch. 2, esp. pp. 37–46.

motives, but by these small things betrayed the greater designs he was contemplating for the future. He made himself difficult to approach and displayed so violent a temper toward everyone alike that no one could come near him."

Much of this description must go back to slanders circulated by the enemies of Pausanias. But it is nonetheless plausible that Pausanias, while lord of Byzantium, should in fact have adopted the satrapal style as appropriate to his position and prospects: the sceptical Thucydides for his part describes his behavior forthrightly, finding nothing evidently improbable in it.

At any rate, the Ionians' rejection of their tyrants at the first opportunity would be all the easier to understand if they had tended to adopt the aloof and gorgeous style of the Persians, whose system they had entered. Herodotus does refer to Aristagoras' tyranny under the Persians uniquely as a *basileie* (5.35.1).<sup>85</sup> Used to define Aristagoras' rule, "*basileia*" points to the Milesian view (from Hecataeus?) of his city's status and of Aristagoras' own position *vis-à-vis* the Persians. It could be, too, that this locution preserves a memory of Aristagoras' Persianizing style and pretensions: at any rate, one can hardly suppose that a personage occupying an Ionian "*basileia*" would fail to project a style of personal *grandeur* guaranteed to breed resentment among those who considered themselves his natural peers. If so, then we have located a cultural motive reinforcing the political and economic forces ranged against the client tyrannies of Darius.

## V. The Outbreak

Thus on the eve of the revolt at the end of the sixth century Darius had, in sum, paralyzed and alienated the political classes of Ionia, especially those of the three big islands on which, together with Miletus, Ionian naval power largely would rest,<sup>86</sup> while at the same time he had enlarged and enriched them. Moreover, he had provided them with a powerful navy, which at the Keys of Cyprus (5.112.1) would overmatch the only other naval power of consequence under Persia, the Phoenicians.

The means were at hand. But did a united resolution exist to revolt from the Persians? And did the real aims of the Ionians at the outset go as far as full independence from Persian power? Histiaeus' lurid claim to have instigated the

85 Herodotus, who normally distinguishes carefully between *basileus* and *tirannos*, here commits a striking anomaly in using *basileie*: A. Ferrill, "Herodotus on Tyranny," *Historia* 27 (1978) 391 with J.E. Powell's *Lexicon to Herodotus*<sup>2</sup> (1950) s. vv. *tiranneuo* and cognates following. For the Medo-Persian imperial titlature, "King of kings," see R. Frye, "The Charisma of Kingship in Ancient Iran," *Iranica Antiqua* 4 (1964) 37.

86 At Lade these four powers supplied 310 of the 353 triremes counted by Herodotus; the three islands alone supplied 230 (6.8).



revolt because Darius was planning a transfer of populations between Ionia and Phoenicia (6.3) is, in retrospect, a measure of the Ionians' reluctance to break their bridges to Persia. Histiaeus knew that only so dreadful a prospect could justify him in the Ionians' eyes, even at the time when they were basking in their recent, and apparently decisive, success against the Phoenicians.<sup>87</sup>

Thus when the Milesians turned the Ionian tyrants over to their subjects (5.37), the Mytileneans put their man Coes to death (5.38.1), but most of the other tyrants fled into exile with the Persians (5.38.2, 6.9.2). Surely they were let free by their cities because the Persians would be bound to avenge any harm to these tyrants, who were "King's Benefactors." Moreover, if things turned out badly they might serve as useful mediators with the Persians for their cities, which they naturally would prefer to recover unspoiled, as they did indeed try to do before the battle of Lade (cf. 6.9.2–10).

Nor did the Ionians make any move during the months afterward that the Persians could construe as hostile. The Dorian Greeks also remained quiet.<sup>88</sup> J. Balcer notes acutely that even "during the lengthy winter months of 499/498, before the Athenians and Eretrians arrived in Ionia, the revolutionaries failed to prepare a systematic military offensive policy."<sup>89</sup> Yes, but not out of the muddle and irresolution that Balcer sees in this fact. These Ionians would soon defeat the Phoenicians at sea and, with Carian aid, generally hold their ground on the mainland.<sup>90</sup> The Ionians stood pat because they were hoping to achieve a peaceful accommodation with Artaphrenes.

87 Hdt. 5.108.1 coordinates Histiaeus' journey from Susa to the coast (note the imperfect *ekomizeto*) with events in Cyprus down to the Ionian victory at sea and the subsequent defeat of the Cypriotes in the field, followed by sieges in progress of the rebel cities (5.108.2–115). The last besieged city, Soli, probably fell in the winter of 498/7, after a five-months' siege (5.115.2). Assuming that this concurrence is correct, Histiaeus would have reached Ionia after the return of the fleet from Cypriote waters in late (?) summer 498.

88 Herodotus' silence concerning the Dorian Greeks in his account of the revolt, including his fellow citizens of Halicarnassus, speaks volumes, especially contrasted to his eulogy of Artemisia (7.99; 8.68–69, 87–88, 101–103). We can only conclude from his silence that the mainland Dorians accepted Persian domination and did not participate in the revolt, even after the Persians suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Carians near Carian Pegasus, which lay only a kilometer north of Halicarnassus itself. Only Lindos on Rhodes may have made some gesture of autonomy, which brought a visit from the Medes attested in the Marmor Parium: cf. Tozzi, *Rivolta ionica* (as in n. 1) 95. Herodotus' narrative (5.171–121) implies that the Carians who went over to revolt were principally those with ties to Miletus. The Persians rewarded the Carians of Pegasus with possession of the hill country of the Milesiad after the revolt (6.20 fin.), a fact that suggests they and probably other Carian communities with ties to the Dorian *poleis* sat out the revolt as well. For the probable quiescence of Dorian Cnidus at this time as well as in the time of Cyrus' conquest see 1.174.3–6.

89 Balcer, *Sparda* (as in n. 1) 36.

90 Phocaea with its famous walls, Priene which had held out against Alyattes, Teos, Erythrae,

The Ionians had already achieved their main goals of overthrowing their tyrants and taking control of their ships and their own waters to defend their autonomy. They now wanted, in all probability, to guarantee their gains by diplomatic agreement while continuing to serve Persian ambitions, as they had done since the days of Cambyses. This goal was not far from what they did receive after the revolt (6.43.3): the internal autonomy they had enjoyed under the emperors before Darius and, probably, adjustments of tribute, while serving again under Persian command.

A *prima facie* case thus arises that many, if not most, of the Greeks of Asia – above all the cities on the mainland which were most vulnerable to Persian power – sensibly enough had no wish to go to war against the world's great power. They would have to come to terms with an expanding world empire whose resources vastly outweighed their own, which possessed other naval subjects, which controlled their hinterland,<sup>91</sup> and whose possession of southeastern Europe – Darius' major achievement – depended squarely on them. Cyrus had reconquered them once before, and Darius himself had published the Bisitun text to illustrate the consequences of insurrection to his subjects. Surely the Ionians must have known that the Persians would never let go altogether.

For their part, the Persians too had powerful motives for avoiding a war against the Ionians. War would depend on inducing the Phoenicians to fight the Ionians, pitting one half of their navy against the other at the very time when they had been planning a major advance by sea. Nor could the Persians take Phoenician cooperation altogether for granted. On a previous occasion they had refused service to a Persian emperor (3.19.2). This time they would not put to sea until the revolt in Cyprus threatened Semitic Amathus (Hamath); moreover, the arrival of the Ionian navy itself off Cyprus threatened their control of their own waters (5.108). The Phoenicians' later willingness to sail once more against the Ionians in Ionian waters is explained by their initial defeat by the Ionians at the Keys: the Phoenicians could never allow the existence of an aggressive rival navy to threaten their waters and their commerce.

Meanwhile, the sudden arrival of Athenian and Eretrian forces in Asia turned the scale of the situation, in the Persians' eyes, from local recalcitrance to a war of invasion, and forced the Ionians themselves off the fence.<sup>92</sup> Aristagoras

and even Myus, a community able to furnish only three ships to the fleet, held out until the end came with Lade (6.8).

91 The Ionians therefore may have continued to pay something to the Persians long after Mycale. See Murray (as in n. 36), 147; Balcer, *Sparda* (as in n. 1) 204–226 argues for a dichotomy of economic interests and orientation between the fortified *asty* and open *chora* of Ionian towns, in which the landlords of the *chora* continued payments to the Persians after 479.

92 The report in the *Peri Eretrias* of the local historian Lysanias of Mallus, accepted by

used these new forces, raised outside Ionia proper, to burn the Ionians' bridges for them, and to prove the Milesians' own depth of commitment to all potential allies, possibly including those in Cyprus (cf. 5.104), who were watching events.<sup>93</sup> The Cypriots and those Carians in Miletus' sphere of influence who joined the resistance did so only after the destruction of Artaphrenes' capital of Sardis put reconciliation with him beyond the Ionians' reach (cf. 5.109.3). And only then, would it appear, did the Ionians come together at the Panionian *koinon* and at last launch their ships on a war footing at the Salaminian Onesilus' express behest (5.100–102.1; cf. 108.2).

In sum, Herodotus' account credibly yields a state of suspense willfully broken by Aristagoras. His parochial motives are illuminated by his first move in the war. Before marching on Sardis, he arranged the repatriation of the Paeonians from Pontic Phrygia to their old home on the Strymon, to provide a counterweight against the hostile Edoni in the neighborhood of Myrkinos.<sup>94</sup> To keep secure this ready refuge and potential source of income for the war was not only an immediate need but a continuation, under new circumstances, of the larger Milesian effort to secure new sources of metallic and other wealth. The Paeonians earlier had controlled some of the mines of the coastal sector and, after their defeat by the Persians, those not deported fled upriver and continued to coin large denominations in silver.<sup>95</sup> In short, the friendship of the Paeonians was vital to the Milesians' hopes of exploiting the metals of the Strymon region.

Balcer, *Sparda* (as in n. 1) 236–238, asserts that the Eretrians defeated the Cyprians in Pamphylian waters before landing at Ephesus to march on Sardis, thereby succeeding in raising a siege of Miletus (*FGrHist* 426 F 1 = Plut. *De Herod. mal.* 861 B–D). Lysanias would have the Persians acting swiftly indeed after Aristagoras' arrest of the tyrants; but this is only a patriotic fiction: cf. O. Murray (as in n. 1) *CAH*<sup>2</sup> IV.468. Plutarch's citation of Charon of Lampsacus (*FGrHist* 262 F 10) in this same passage does not support Lysanias; Plutarch cites Charon here only in contradiction of Herodotus' account of the Persians' defeat of the Athenians who burned Sardis.

- 93 "The other allies," mentioned at 5.99.1 fin. and again at 102 fin. cannot have been numerous, nor can they have represented their cities, if they were brigaded together with the Milesians and put under the command of the Milesian *strategoi* (5.99.2); they would have been volunteers intending to commit their cities by their presence, or even adventurers bent on loot, not city levies voted by the cities or the *koinon*. Herodotus' understanding that this army was pan-Ionian must be attributed to his programmatic view that all Ionia was now in revolt (5.98.2), a view perhaps descending from the propaganda of Aristagoras, whose interest lay in portraying the expedition as an act of united Ionians.
- 94 The Edoni had migrated into the lands of the weakened Paeonians around Myrkinos on the heels of Megabazus' march and inhabited the area already at the time of its settlement of Myrkinos: cf. Hdt. 5.126.2; Thuc. 1.100.3; 4.102.2 and 107.3, with Hammond in *HM* (as in n. 43) II 68, noting Hdt. 5.11.2.
- 95 A. Fol and N.G.L. Hammond, "Persia in Europe, apart from Greece," in *CAH*<sup>2</sup> IV.252 with nn. 25–27.

The Paeonians now rescued by Aristagoras were landed at Doriscus, a key Persian garrison near the mouth of the Nestus (5.98.4 fin., cf. 7.59.1), and they must have attacked the place successfully, since they made their way home afterward. Below Myrkinos at the mouth of the Strymon was another Persian fort, Eion (7.25, 107, 113; 8.118), and this too the Paeonians must have taken by the time Aristagoras arrived at Myrkinos by sea some time later (5.126). If, as is likely, Aristagoras also organized the raid of Thraco-Scythians from the lower Danube into Miltiades' principality about this time, driving him from the Chersonese temporarily, then his operations may have aimed at dominating the whole seaboard of eastern Thrace.<sup>96</sup>

Artaphrenes' own quiescence before the burning of Sardis, meanwhile, appears in his lack of response to this flight of the Paeonians, in which both the Chians and the Lesbians had collaborated with Aristagoras. Persian cavalry did pursue them to the coast, but when the Paeonians slipped their grasp, the Persians did not – as far as Herodotus reports – attack any of the Greeks (5.98). The Paeonians' escape, that is, was apparently ignored by Artaphrenes as a local affair that concerned only the Megabazids, who had settled the Paeonians in their satrapy (5.15.3), and who must have organized the pursuit.

Herodotus' account thus reflects an essentially accurate tradition in giving center stage to Aristagoras and the Milesians' ambitions in the Cyclades and Thrace. Its whole first act was orchestrated by their initiative. Aristagoras' coup in bringing in the Athenians was the single most decisive factor in convincing the islanders to mobilize. By the time it was clear that the Athenians would not come again in their ships to fight Persia, the Ionians and Cypriot Greeks would already be at war.

The Ionian fleet, apparently allied to Athens and strong enough to face the Persians' Levantine fleet based on the Phoenician squadrons, in turn encouraged insurrection in Cyprus. Darius' inclusion of Cyprus as a tributary under the Syro-Phoenician satrapy had created a state of affairs comparable to the situation at Miletus, in threatening the independence of the Cypriot Greek kings, who had entered the empire freely (3.19 fin., 91).<sup>97</sup>

The revolt in Cyprus in turn encouraged the Ionians by providing them with another important ally, a mission, and the prospect of a new paymaster. At this time, the initiative passed from Aristagoras and the Milesians to the Ionian *koinon*, when the decision to aid the Cypriotes had to be made collectively or not at all. The ascendancy of the *koinon*, and its decision to sail well over a

<sup>96</sup> See Appendix B.

<sup>97</sup> Argued by V. Karageorghis, "Cyprus," in *CAH*<sup>2</sup> III.1, 69f., who also emphasizes the penetration of Ionian material culture in Cyprus, which replaced Egyptian influence after the Persian conquest. See also R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (1972) 480–482.

thousand kilometers to do battle in Phoenician waters,<sup>98</sup> is most reasonably interpreted as reflecting the influence of the three island powers, which had the strongest interest in stopping Persia at the water's edge, versus Miletus, whose future would best be served – as Histiaeus knew – by recovering her position as the leading Ionian collaborator of the Persians.

## VI. Histiaeus

Histiaeus arrived in Ionia after the second summer of the war (498) ended auspiciously with the Ionians' naval victory at the Keys of Cyprus.<sup>99</sup> He was sent by Darius and entered events as his agent. If we are to understand Histiaeus' role, therefore, we must first understand affairs from his master's point of view. At the least, Darius' plans to move across the Aegean were threatened by the prospective losses in Ionian and Phoenician naval power, unless the war was brought to an end without further serious fighting at sea. Worse, Darius – himself a usurper – could well suppose that the war in the western satrapies might turn up a threat to his own throne. Immured in his palace, Darius was in touch with events only through messages that might contain no more than what their authors thought it safe or profitable to themselves for him to know (5.105.1ff.); his only check on such information was an informal inspectorate consisting of agents such as Histiaeus himself.<sup>100</sup> But their reports, too, might be edited, distorted, or simply out of date.

At the outset of the events, before the high passes on the Royal Road between Sardis and Susa were closed by the snows in the winter of 499/8, substantially all that Darius had before him, in all probability, were dispatches from his half-brother announcing that the Ionian tyrants had been expelled and

98 Distance: measured conservatively from Bodrum to Silifke.

99 Chronology: See n. 87 above. Darius' need for accurate intelligence as well as the order of the narrative from 5.108 to 6.1 argues for Histiaeus' early departure from Susa: during the first summer of the revolt (499) or the next spring at the latest. He must then have spent some time in Sardis, organizing the plot among Artaphrenes' courtiers (6.4) before proceeding to the coast. The battle at the Keys was probably fought in 498, but almost certainly no later: the Ionians' interest lay in employing their ships, rather than keeping them laid up. The date of Lade is in greater dispute, but no one to my knowledge puts it earlier than 496. R. Van Compernelle, "La date de la bataille navale de Lade", *AC* 27 (1958) 383–389, puts Lade in 494; but his arguments, in my view, fit 495 better: the siege of Miletus could well have lasted most of a year. The length of this siege (6.18), from which we could otherwise calculate backward to the date of Lade, is the key unknown of the entire chronology of the revolt.

100 S. Hirsch, *The Friendship of the Barbarians* (1985) 101ff., challenges the existence of the Persian official whom the Greeks thought they knew as the "King's Eye." Whatever the case, the King necessarily sought his information from agents and inspectors on the spot, whether appointed to their commission or voluntary informers. Cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.2.10.

had taken refuge with him. Then, in early summer of 498, Artaphrenes' message will have come that Sardis had been burned by Greeks and that the Ionian fleet was now in enemy hands. In the next summer by the latest the satrap of Syrophenicia will have reported the siege of Phoenician Amathus by the Greeks of Salamis (5.105) and the rout of the Phoenician fleet. If unrest was still severe in Egypt as well,<sup>101</sup> then the dimensions of the possible crisis were immense: Persia's maritime provinces, and her fleets with them, were in danger of falling away. Without these, Persia's foothold in Europe would be lost as well.

Darius, meanwhile, had also to base his calculations on the facts that Artaphrenes – son of his own father (5.25.1) and eligible by blood for the throne – had proclaimed an emergency in his distant corner of the empire, while he and the other western satraps were mustering all the local forces available to them, and were together describing a crisis that called for a major mobilization of the empire's forces. Here was a situation which, as on subsequent occasions in Achaemenid history, contained opportunities for an attempt on the throne. There is no reason to presume that Darius – the Darius we know from his own words in the Bisitun inscription – was anything but paranoically vigilant throughout his reign.

Hence to serve Artaphrenes Darius chose men whose loyalty was to himself. He appointed Otanes, who was very close to the throne, to share the command with Artaphrenes (5.123). The emperor also sent Hydarnes II, a son of one of the Seven, Artaphrenes' eventual successor (6.133.1, 7.135), and a major prop of the throne.<sup>102</sup> Datis the Mede, soon to be commander of the campaign that ended at Marathon, was also in Ionia by 495 at the latest.<sup>103</sup> Also Darius

101 Disturbed conditions are attested in Egypt, where Darius campaigned in person to unseat the satrap appointed by Cambyses, one Aryandes, who was executed for rebellion (5.166f., 200–203) at some time between ca. 510, when he mounted an expedition against Barca, and 492 when his successor Pherendates is mentioned in three demotic papyri: E. Bresciani, "The Persian Occupation of Egypt," in *CHP* II.507. Hdt. 2.110.2f. with Polyaeus 7.11.7 (on Darius' personal suppression of Aryandes) puts Darius in Egypt after his Scythian campaign and his stay afterward at Sardis (5.11 init., al.). Therefore Aryandes' revolt should fall on either side of ca. 508. Egypt revolted again in 486, pointing to endemic unrest throughout the period bracketing the Ionian revolt.

The Ionians may have concluded that the not inconsiderable Egyptian navy was unavailable to the Persians, and Herodotus' account does reflect the absence or weak participation of the Egyptians at sea, where the brunt appears to have been borne altogether by the Phoenicians (the Keys: 5.107 fin., 112.1; Lade: 6.6, 14 init.; after Lade: 25.1, 26.1, 33.2f., 41).

102 Hydarnes was in Ionia by 493 at the latest, and received a Spartan mission to Sardis at some time before 480; later in Greece he appears as Xerxes' hazarapat, commander of the Immortals (7.83.1 al.), and then of the royal escort on the retreat (8.118.1).

103 He is found on the road to Susa, doubtless to report to the King: D.M. Lewis, "Datis the Mede," *JHS* 100 (1980) 194f.

evidently sent his half-brother no help from the inner satrapies, since the stronger Carian and Greek cities of the mainland remained out of Persian hands until after Lade and the fall of Miletus (6.25 fin., 32f.).

When Histiaeus' mission to end the revolt failed, the King waited until Ionia had been subdued and large new forces were raised for the reoccupation of Thrace. Then he moved in deliberate steps against his half-brother; first he dismissed Artaphrenes' generals and appointed new men (6.43 init.) before removing Artaphrenes himself, who disappears from the scene at this time. Finally Artaphrenes' successor, Mardonius – yet another son of one of the Seven and the brother of Darius' first wife (7.2.2) – deposed all the client tyrants reinstalled by Artaphrenes and established *demokratias* in the cities (6.43.3), thereby severing the personal bonds of Artaphrenes in Ionia and creating new ones for himself.

At the Persian court the major dynastic consequence of the revolt was the eclipse of Artaphrenes' line. In 490 the diminished status of Artaphrenes' son and evident successor at Sardis is attested by his junior authority in command to Datis (6.94.2; cf. 97.1, 98.1, 118.1): the world radiating from Susa witnessed the spectacle of the emperor's own nephew below a Mede. And, in 480, this Artaphrenes II was granted only a minor divisional command, over Lydians and Mysians (7.74.2).

Histiaeus' actions as reported by Herodotus – including first of all his intrigues ἀποστάσεος πέρι with the Persians of Artaphrenes' suite (6.4.1) – are perfectly consistent when seen, not from the perspective of the Ionian traditions that preserved Histiaeus' "disinformation," but from the Susan perspective of Darius. If the Persians at Sardis had trusted a Greek so far as to plot with him against the Great King's half-brother, then Histiaeus must have given them strong and concrete proofs of Darius' will in the matter. Darius' need to conciliate the Ionians had been thwarted by Artaphrenes, who was determined to reimpose the Ionian tyrants against the King's own policy, i.e., the policy finally carried out by Mardonius. Histiaeus' mission, then, would have been to end the revolt, before more damage was done to Persia's naval arm by removing or neutralizing Artaphrenes, and then to prepare a settlement based on the restoration of Ionian self-government.<sup>104</sup> But Histiaeus' Persian allies against Artaphrenes were betrayed, and the tradition even remembers their betrayer, one Hermippus of Atarneus (6.4.1).

Aristagoras responded to Histiaeus' presence in Ionia by sailing with his faction for Myrkinos (5.124–126; cf. 6.5.1). He sailed out of reach of Histiaeus because he well understood what Histiaeus intended: to bring the authors of the revolt to justice (cf. 5.124), take control of Miletus once more, return the city to her *status quo ante* under the Persians, and then arrange a peace. Aristagoras'

<sup>104</sup> Cf. Tozzi, *Rivolta ionica* (as in n. 1) 192–96.

partisan, the logographer Hecataeus, had proposed that Aristagoras fortify the Milesian island of Leros (cf. Strabo 14.1.6), from which he and his faction might win their way back into Miletus (5.125, cf. 36). But Myrkinos was safer and offered many more resources than Leros, a rock which was a trap if the Milesians or Histiaeus wanted to capture him. And at Myrkinos Aristagoras could forestall its *ktistes* Histiaeus, should he too make for this obvious refuge, as he was to do, after Aristagoras himself died fighting the local Thracians (5.126.2).

Hecataeus survived the revolt, and Herodotus' account of him may go back to Hecataeus' own testimony.<sup>105</sup> It tells us that at this time, when the Ionians were in control of their own waters, Aristagoras and his faction were worried not about the Persians but about their own position within Miletus. They were being threatened both by rivals thrown up by the free government (cf. 5.125) and by partisans of Histiaeus, whose attempt to force his way into the city, failure though it was (6.5.2), necessarily implies that he counted on confederates within the walls.

Histiaeus' attempt to reclaim his city, and so take control of Miletus' war fleet, was his first act upon leaving Sardis and deceiving the Chians into aiding him. But his repulse aroused the suspicions of the Chians once again (6.5.2), and he was now without resources. He had to create an independent position or go under. While remaining a servant of Darius, who alone could eventually guarantee his accomplishments, Histiaeus necessarily turned to building a command to compete against Artaphrenes in order to reconquer Ionia for Darius. The Mytileneans – enemies of the Chians who were to flee in concert at Lade – put eight triremes under Histiaeus' command (6.5).<sup>106</sup>

105 Jacoby dismisses Hecataeus' advice at 5.124 and 5.36 as being "aus novellistischer Tradition," analogous to Herodotus' notices concerning other *sophoi* like Bias and Thales: *FGrHist* Ia, p. 317, commenting on Hecataeus T 5–6. I believe his judgement too categorical, because Hecataeus' advice at 5.124, at any rate, answers to the actual circumstances in Miletus as far as we can see them.

106 Cyrus had given Atarneus to the Chians for delivering up to him the Lydian rebel Pactyes (1.160.5), though Atarneus lay directly opposite Mytilene in her natural peraea. Cyrus thus created a bone of contention between two island powers not yet in Persian control. Persian policy in Phoenicia provides a parallel: the text of the *Res gestae* of King Eshmunazar II of Sidon reads in part:

The lord of kings [sc. Artaxerxes I: reg. 465–424] also gave us Dor and Jaffa, the powerful lands of Dagon which are in the plain of Sharon, in proportion to my mighty deeds. And to the boundaries of our land we added them, so that they shall forever belong to Sidon. (H. Donner and W. Röllig, *Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften*, 3 vols. [1962–65] 14 and 18–19; tr. S. Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians* [1968] 25.)

Dor and Jaffa, and the Plain of Sharon, lie in the natural sphere of Tyre, the major rival of Sidon since Assyrian times. Pseudo-Scylax (ca. 350 B.C.) states moreover that Tyre controlled the coast from Sarepta to Mt. Carmel (*GGM* I.78). Thus the possessions of



Why should they have done so? Because by taking up Histiaeus the Mytileneans replaced what they had rashly thrown away by executing their tyrant Coes (5.38.1). Histiaeus would be an influential leader and mediator for them with Darius when the need should arise; in the meantime they seized the opportunity to become a power in their own right under a leader who, they now knew, was a loyal friend of the Great King.<sup>107</sup> For Histiaeus could have convinced the Mytileneans of his value to them only by showing them his true colors.

Histiaeus needed money, ships, and men. Sailing to Byzantium, he and his Mytileneans preyed on Ionian shipping from the Pontus, and recruited the crews who were willing to follow him (5.126–6.6, 26.1). By the time of Lade Histiaeus had made himself master of the Propontis and Hellespont. After Lade he and his Mityleneans conquered Chios and, with more forces recruited from Ionia, tried to capture Thasos, which was the principal obstacle to Milesian access to the metals of Pangaeus. But on returning to Lesbos with his fleet to defend the island from the Phoenicians he was captured at Atarneus by the Persians and executed by Artaphrenes as the author of the revolt (6.26–30; cf. 6.1.2).

Histiaeus' activities in the north were the main operations in the war during the interval between the two naval battles, off the Keys of Cyprus and Lade respectively, that decided its course. He set out to create a sphere in the Propontis and north Aegean that would include both Lesbos and Chios. This sphere would be maintained by tolls, by recruitment of shipping from the Black Sea, and by the mines of Thasos and Thrace, with a navy capable of standing against the Phoenician fleet, now depleted in battle at Lade (cf. 6.15.2, 28.1). In this course he carried the ambitions not only of the Lesbians, but of numerous individual confederates, those Ionians and Aeolians whom he recruited for his campaign against Thasos after Lade (6.28.1), when his standard became the only Ionian alternative to capture or unconditional submission to Artaphrenes.<sup>108</sup>

Sidon and Tyre were intermingled in the Persian period, in partial consequence at least of Persian policy aimed at intensifying local rivalries.

107 Cf. Thucydides' emphasis on the Mytileneans' long and careful preparation for revolt against Athens (3.2.1–2). Their aim then was to bring all of Lesbos into union under them. Interestingly Herodotus appears to use "Lesbians" and "Mytileneans" more or less synonymously throughout his revolt narrative (5.26, 38.1, 94.1–2, 95.2, 98.4; 6.5.2, 6, 8.1–2, 14.3, 26.1, 27.3, 28.1): possibly the Mytileneans in 428 were trying to recreate a hegemony they had temporarily achieved over the whole island in this earlier period.

108 This view is closest to that of Swoboda, *RE* VIII 2 (1913) art. "Histiaios," col. 2049, who retreats from Heinlein's supposition (as in n. 52), 349–351, that Histiaeus aimed to create an Ionian satrapy with himself at its head. A. Blamire's conclusion ("Herodotus and Histiaeus," *CQ* n.s. 9 [1959] 148), that Histiaeus had no ambitious goals, stands his career, and the character which it reveals, on its head. But Swoboda's view, followed by E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*<sup>3</sup> (1939) IV 287, that Histiaeus was aiming to establish an independent "Inselreich," ignores his long relationship with Darius, the posthumous honor Darius showed him, and, more importantly, his recognition of the real limits of Ionian power.

After his fall, Histiaeus' claim to have instigated the revolt – a role already given him by Aristagoras' ruse of the Tattooed Slave, and then ratified by Artaphrenes' accusations – outlived him to confuse Ionian posterity, while the Persians used it to persecute Greeks whom they no longer welcomed in their dominions, such as Histiaeus' ally Miltiades, the Athenian tyrant of the Chersonese.<sup>109</sup> However, Darius' posthumous honor to Histiaeus rendered his aims and role a conundrum to the Ionians and to Herodotus, who received – and tried to reconcile – facts and traditions of widely conflicting import. Herodotus follows Aristagoras' and Artaphrenes' claim that Histiaeus authored the revolt, which was reinforced in turn by Histiaeus' own alibi to the Ionians (6.2.2–3). Yet there were the awkward facts of Histiaeus' campaign against Ionians and other Greeks with his Mytilenean turncoats, and the posthumous honor it earned him from the Great King.

Herodotus did his best to reconcile these opposing phenomena by portraying Histiaeus as a paragon of supple deceit who, though responsible in great measure for the revolt, would have found his way back into Darius' favor had he lived (6.30.1). This solution fit his idea of the Persians. For he says in praise of Persian justice, “not even the Great King himself may slay anyone for a single offense, nor may any other Persian inflict an irremediable punishment upon any of his servants; only if he should find upon calculation that the man's crimes are more and greater than the sum of his services may he then satisfy his wrath” (1.137.1).<sup>110</sup> Herodotus believed that in Darius' eyes Histiaeus had saved the Persian empire at the Danube bridge (7.18). With this achievement and Darius' posthumous honor to Histiaeus' memory surely in mind, he concluded that the Great King would have forgiven Histiaeus had he lived (6.30.1).

## V. Persian Ionia After the Revolt

In reverting to the well-trying policy of his predecessors, Darius went far to meet the Ionians' original grievances. His nominee tyrants had needed less to conciliate their own people than to conciliate the Persians. It was to the Persians that the tyrant was responsible for his position and for his city's tribute, and it was those who were outside his junta who had been made to pay. In the matter of making up the tribute, as well as supporting the domestic expenses of the tyrant, the *apragmon* had as much to lose as the man of thwarted ambition. The extortionist's role of the vassal tyrant could touch everyone in the community who had anything to lose. Thus the Samians' men of property were incensed by the

<sup>109</sup> See Appendix B.

<sup>110</sup> Cyrus and Darius, but not Cambyses and Xerxes, obey this law in Herodotus. On his Achaemenid royal portraits, see Georges, *Barbarian Asia* (as in n. 1) 176–203.

desertion of their captains at Lade, and resolved to settle elsewhere with what they still possessed before the Persians could reinstall the tyrant Aeaces (6.22.1).

*Isonomia* was therefore a cry for fiscal as well as political fair play within the cities, and it is in this light that the final Persian settlement in Ionia is best understood. Before his deposition Artaphrenes had ordered the territories of the Greek cities resurveyed in Persian units and fixed the tribute for each accordingly. He also compelled the Ionians to submit their quarrels to arbitration, wherein final appeal belonged to the satrap at Sardis, "so that they would not raid one another" (6.42).

The immediate purpose of this measure must have been to avert violence over the border disputes that were bound to ensue with the resurvey and the occupation of some lands by Persians and Carians, as at Miletus (6.20).<sup>111</sup> But it also institutionalized Artaphrenes' influence at a yet more intrusive level in the common affairs of the Greeks. Moreover the tribute census was severe, since it was designed to produce prewar levels of revenue despite the loss of population, territory, and precious metals incurred in the defeat – and he put the tyrants back to enforce it. In brief, Artaphrenes harshly recreated the conditions that had induced the Ionians to risk insurrection, and in a more onerous way. His policy made no sense if the Persians were to go on using the Ionians as an arm of their navy, and it confirms him as a vindictive incompetent whom Darius could ill afford to keep in place.

Faced above all with the need to re-enlist the Greeks into Persia's maritime service, his successor Mardonius preserved the requirement that the cities must submit their quarrels to satrapal arbitration, but for the rest wholly repudiated Artaphrenes' policy<sup>112</sup> and probably also halved the tribute due under Artaphrenes' census.<sup>113</sup>

The change of governments allowed the cities themselves to decide how the tribute levy would be raised among the citizens, and how the forces required by

111 Cf. M.N. Tod, *SGHI*, vol. 2 no. 113. This is the record of an arbitration of a boundary dispute between Miletus and Myus which was heard by a panel of judges representing the Ionian *koinon*. Final appeal was to Struses, satrap of Sardis between 392 and 388 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.17–19; Diod. 14.99).

112 When Xerxes left this same Mardonius in command in Greece after Salamis, he offered the Athenians a position notably like that of Miletus before the revolt, with autonomy and an imperial sphere of their own choosing under Persian suzerainty (8.140a2).

I owe this view of Artaphrenes' and Megabates' aggrandizing policies, versus the informed flexibility of the later Darius and his agent Mardonius, to Professor E. Badian. He observed further that there were "practically no preconditions, save suzerainty to the King," imposed on member entities of the empire such as Miletus and, potentially, Athens, whose relationship to the ruling power he compared to that of *civitates foederatae* under Rome.

113 Polyaeus 7.11.3; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 172f. See Murray (as in n. 36), 142–156 and M. Corsaro, "Tassazione regia e tassazione cittadina dagli Achemenidi ai re ellenistici," *REA* 37 (1985) 80–86.

Mardonius would be raised and led – measures bound to improve morale. Most important in the long run, the new dispensation gave the Ionians room to work their passage back to the advantages of membership in the Persian empire without its worst concomitant abuses. The story of Hecataeus' mission to Artaphrenes (*sic*) after the revolt, in which he convinced the Persian to salve the Ionians' resentments and restore their good faith toward the Persians, by allowing them their laws and imposing fixed tributes according to their ability to pay, need not be strictly true to reflect the actual state of affairs in post-revolt Ionia, for which some Greeks – certainly including Hecataeus himself – wished to reap credit.<sup>114</sup>


Henceforth the Ionians would enjoy peace and a modicum of autonomy while they nursed a version of recent history that blamed those Milesians who brought the ships from Athens and Eretria, which were the “beginning of evils” (5.97.3; cf. *Il.* 5.62–63). In 480, Xerxes' propaganda of vengeance against Athens for the burning of Sardis, and his great sacrificial feast around the altars of Troy (7.43), were gestures that appealed directly to Ionian sentiments concerning the origins of the catastrophe. Over the intervening years the wounds had healed so well that the Ionians rendered loyal and effective service in a war that, but for Salamis, would have gone far to restore the old position and prosperity of Ionia in the Persian empire.<sup>115</sup>

114 Diodorus 10.25.4 = Hecataeus, *FGrHist* 1 T 7, from Ephorus according to Jacoby. Herodotus' description of Artaphrenes' settlement, in which the Ionians were directed to pay nearly what they had been paying before, and which remained fixed down to his own day (6.42.2), does not contradict the tradition that Mardonius halved it. Mardonius could not have formally repudiated a fiat just promulgated by the King's half-brother; but he certainly could have shown himself lenient and forbearing in response to appeals from the Ionians.

Persian exactions overall were significantly less onerous and systematic than the strict exactions of the Athenians, who succeeded the Persian as tribute-collectors and shocked their allies by their inflexibility (Thuc. 1.99.1). The Persians necessarily had to be satisfied with what they could get, if they were not to rule their subjects insecurely by the constant imposition of force; for example, the Persians made do with 80 Phoenician ships at Cnidus in 394, far short of the 300 allegedly demanded (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1 with Diod. 14.80, probably from the Oxyrhynchus historian). Moreover, Persian Kings made a virtue of this necessity by customarily inaugurating their reigns by commuting arrears of tribute (Hdt. 6.59).

115 Georges, *Barbarian Asia* (as in n. 1) 61–63.

## Appendix A: The Descent of Megabates



This stemma goes back to the period before Darius' monarchy, which he attained when young (his father was alive and active in Parthia during the *Putsch* with the help of older men, including the brothers (?) Oebares and Megabazus I. Their relationship is presumed on the reappearance of the rare onomastic Oebares as a son of Megabazus in the next generation, and on the manifest closeness of both men to Darius. All of the patronymics for the crucial next generation are attested by Herodotus except Megabates as the son of Megabazus I. This relationship, however, can be securely inferred from the following facts:

- (i) Megabates is the next attested satrap at Dascyleium after Oebares the son of Megabazus I. It is with him that Pausanias the Spartan allegedly began his secret negotiations with the Persians while at Byzantium, just across the straits from his satrapy.
- (ii) Megabazus II must be placed in charge of the Aeolian and Propontic Greek naval contingent in 480, by elimination. Of the four Persian admirals, Ariabignes led the Ionians and Carians, Achaemenes the Egyptians; Prexaspes son of Aspathines and Megabates led the rest (7.97). Prexaspes presumably is the son of one of the Seven (cf. the Bisitun Inscription, DNe and DNd: Aspathines and Gobryas bear the weapons of Darius); in Herodotus' version of the overthrow of the the Magi, he is attached to Otanes, on the one hand, and Hydarnes I, on the other (3.70), and was wounded in the final *mêlée* (3.78.2). His name probably indicates direct descent as well from Prexaspes, betrayer of the Magi (3.34f.) and the hazarapat of Cambyses in the traditions received by Herodotus (3.30.3, al.). The stemma, then, is Prexaspes I-Aspathines-Prexaspes II, based on G.G. Ca-

meron's reading of the patronymic Parrakaspi (= Prexaspes) on the seal of the high official Aspacana (=Aspathines): *Persepolis Treasury Texts* (1948) 104. He is thus the likelier choice for the important Phoenician-Cilician-Cypriot command (suggested also by the link to Gobryas, whose family's power rested on Babylon and Syro-Phoenicia). This leaves only the Greeks of his father's satrapy for Megabazus II, cadet of the house of Megabazid Dascyleium.

- (iii) Of the four sons of Megabazus I only Pherendates is not attested in the Thracio-Macedonian and Phrygian sphere of the family's power-base. In 480 he commanded the Sarangae, evidently a northern Iranian people (7.67.1); possibly he was at that time attached to the palace.
- (iv) Finally, a negative argument: R.T. Hallock's suggested identification of the Bakabadus / Bakabadu of the *Persepolis Fortification Texts* with Megabates I in *CHI* II.591 is disproved by the texts themselves. This Megabates is an "elite guide" (*PFT* 1557) and "delivery man" of yet another official who is in charge of grain stores at a certain post called Sugallen (1962); moreover he is in the interior not only in Darius' 23rd year (= 499 B.C.), but in the years before and after as well (502, 1495, 1530, etc.: he is active from 503 to 494, with gaps in the dating record). The other Megabates of the *PFT* is Bakabada (= OP Bagapata), who seems to be even less important than Megabates I, and is in any case also in the interior before, during, and after 499 (*PFT* 215, 144, 306, 375, 938, 1926, etc.).

#### Appendix B: Miltiades' Career During the Revolt

As ruler of the Thracian Chersonese (Gallipoli), Miltiades had established a marriage alliance with a Thracian chieftain, Olorus, whose lands lay in the metalliferous region opposite Thasos,<sup>116</sup> between the Paeonians' territory on the Strymon and the targets of their eastward raids, such as Perinthus. The Persians' operations in Europe, especially their destruction of the Paeonians' power, increased the security of Miltiades' father-in-law Olorus, and that of Miltiades' own principality: Darius in his initial advance through eastern Thrace up the Ebro gap (5.89.3ff.), and Megabazus in marching east through Thrace (5.14ff.), both traversed the territory of the Apsinthian Thracians, who were

116 The historian Thucydides son of Olorus was probably descended from Miltiades II's son Cimon by the daughter of this Thracian chieftain, Olorus (Marcellinus, *vit. Thuc.* 2), and possessed revenues from mines at Scaptesyle (*ibid.* 14 and 19) in the Thasian peraea (*Thuc.* 4.105.1; cf. *Hdt.* 6.46.3). Ensslin, *RE* XV 2 (1932) art. "Miltiades," col. 1681 identifies Olorus I as king of the Sapaioi, a tribe located in the Scaptesyle district, east of Crenides/Philippi and opposite Thasos (cf. *Appian BC* 4.105). His identification fits the political geography: the Sapaioi were at the backs of the Apsinthian enemies of Miltiades' Dolonci.

enemies of Miltiades' people, the Dolonci (6.34.1).<sup>117</sup>

The case for Miltiades' collaboration with Histiaeus rests on the following grounds:

- (i) His father-in-law Olorus' territory was squarely in the path of Aristagoras' ambitions in Thrace, and Aristagoras' Paeonian allies had been the enemies of Olorus and his Sapaioi. Olorus and Miltiades, therefore, had in all probability been targeted by Aristagoras, and they had a natural interest in collaborating with Histiaeus against him (if he was still alive) or against those Milesians loyal to him at Myrkinos (if he was by this time dead).
- (ii) The Thraco-Scythians who drove Miltiades out of his principality were probably enlisted by Aristagoras in connection with his repossession of Myrkinos.<sup>118</sup> Thraco-Scythian chieftains had accompanied Aristagoras to Sparta: the official Spartan story of King Cleomenes' death had it that he was maddened by unmixed wine, which he learned to drink from Scythians on a mission to Sparta. These Scythians were proposing to invade Media via the river Phasis, while the Spartans marched inland from Ephesus (6.84), an invasion plan similar to Aristagoras' own proposal to Cleomenes (5.50ff.; cf. 5.54.2). The only context for the Scythian plan, then, is Aristagoras' mission to Cleomenes in 499/8, in which he evidently brought with him Thraco-Scythian clients to bolster his case.
- (iii) Miltiades' principality was punitively sacked by the Phoenicians at the conclusion of the revolt (6.31.1–2). He therefore played some role in the revolt. Specifically, Miltiades captured Lemnos with a force of Athenians sailing from the Chersonese (6.140). It had been taken by the Persians with ships from Lesbos at some time between Darius' Scythian campaign and the outbreak of the revolt (5.26). Miltiades could not have taken the island, which involved laying siege to one of its towns, with impunity in peacetime; so its capture probably coincided with Histiaeus' control of these northern Aegean waters.
- (iv) Inferential evidence exists for Miltiades' participation in Histiaeus' siege of Thasos. Thasos was a colony of Paros, and Miltiades was denounced to the

117 The Apsinthians lived just north of the Chersonese (cf. 6.36.2–37.1 and 9.119) as far west as the Hebrus, where the vicinity of Aenus at its mouth was known as Apsinthis from the native population. Strabo vii fr. 58 = Steph. Byz s.v. *Korpiloi*, the people who later supplanted the Apsinthii.

118 H.T. Wade-Gery, "Miltiades," *JHS* 71 (1951) 217 would emend 6.40 extensively to put the Scythian incursion immediately after Darius' retreat from Scythia about 512. But he wrote before the excavations at Istrus revealed the extensive burning caused by a Thraco-Scythian attack (indicated by native arrowheads found in the burnt stratum) at a date contemporary with the Ionian Revolt: D.M. Pippidi, "Cinquante ans de fouilles à Istrus. La tradition littéraire et les données archéologiques et épigraphiques," *Klio* 52 (1970) 355–364; J. Boardman, "Greek Archaeology on the Shores of the Black Sea," *AR* 1962–63, 36ff.

Persian commander Hydarnes by a certain Lysagoras of Paros (7.133.1). It is very odd that a Parian should have any accusation to make against Miltiades unless he had taken part in the attack on Paros' daughter city, led by Histiaeus.

- (v) As he would Histiaeus, Darius honored Miltiades as a benefactor through his captured son Metiochus, whom he adopted into the Persian nobility with benefactions and a bride (6.39.4).